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ABSTRACT
The convergence of intellectual property protections afforded
software, the fundamental liberty interests of voting rights of
Americans and the conduct of voting machine vendors within an
oligopolistic marketplace signals grave consequences for the
public. In an election, Direct Recording Electronic voting
machines (“DREs”) could be subject to malfunctions, inaccuracies
and security problems. The DRE vendors have consistently failed
to improve the voting machines or allow access for independent
auditing and security testing.
The vendors have operated
collectively to maintain current inefficient output quality. Acting
in concert to obtain higher pricing, the vendors operate against
their individual self-interests, claiming proprietary protections.
The result of this oligopoly is serious—the voting process, a public
good, is diminished. Ultimately the federal judiciary and Congress
will face the task of balancing these interests within the context of
an oligopolistic marketplace. At risk is an American liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
A small number of vendors1 fueled by federal dollars2 supply
the majority of Direct Recording Electronic voting machines (or
“DREs”)3 to states in federal elections.4 These few DRE vendors
1
A handful of companies provide the majority of the voting machines to the states for
federal elections including: Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”) (thirty-nine states),
Premier (thirty-one states), Sequoia (eighteen states), Hart InterCivic (twelve states),
MicroVote (three states), Advanced (two states). See infra Appendix I. Company names
were provided in response to a Freedom of Information Request sent by the author to all
fifty states, the responses of which are on file with the author.
2
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 (2006)). HAVA became public law on October 29,
2002. Id. Among other matters HAVA established a program to provide funds to states
to replace punch card voting systems and provided minimum election administration
standards for states and units of local government with the responsibility for the
administration of federal election. Id. HAVA provided over three billion dollars to the
states over four years to incentivize their transition to voting machine technology and to
update election administration standards. See the U.S. Election Assistance Commission
(“EAC”) for the list of vendors registering for certification under HAVA. 2006 U.S.
EAC Ann. Rep. 22, available at http://www.eac.gov/about/report/docs/eac20ar2006.pdf/attachment_download/file [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also
Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1732 (2005) (“The legislation eventually enacted (HAVA) sets
modest mandates for voting systems, while attempting to give the states incentives to
upgrade to better technology. . . . Title I of HAVA authorizes $650 million in payments
to the states, half of which is for the replacement of punch-card ballots and lever voting
machines. States that choose to receive payments under Title I are obligated to replace
their punch card and lever voting equipment by November 2004 . . . .”).
3
The terms ‘direct recording electronic’ voting machines and ‘digital recording
electronic’ voting machines (“DREs”) are used interchangeably. See Michael A. Carrier,
Vote Counting, Technology and Unintended Consequences, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 645,
646 (2005) (describing electronic voting machines by saying that “electronic voting
machines [are] known as direct recording electronic devices (DREs)”); see also DIMITRIS
A. GRITZALIS, SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING 33 (2003) (“The fully computerized systems
are of two formats—Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), where a voting kiosk (similar to
an automatic bank teller machine) is provided at designated polling places, or networked
systems that are used remotely, possibly via Internet/Web access.”); James Belmont
Conn, Race Against the Machine: An Argument for the Standardization of Voting
Technology, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 181, 231 (2006). Conn
describes various voting technologies, such as Electronic Systems:
With electronic voting, voter choices directly enter electronic storage,
using touch screens, push buttons or keyboards. Machines are
typically programmed to prevent overvoting. The most common
models are ‘full faced,’ showing all contests at once, like lever
machines, and a flashing red light alerts voters to the contests in
which they have not yet voted.
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effectively operate as an oligopoly—controlling price and access.5
Simultaneously, within these DREs, the federally protected right to
vote and the vendor’s rights in intellectual property are clashing as
competing interests.6
Scholars of divergent viewpoints have analyzed transparency,
accuracy and software security issues attributable to electronic
voting machines,7 including the lack of a paper ballot.8 Many
Id.
4
Using HAVA as a base, the fifty states were sent a Freedom of Information request,
as this was the most straightforward method to track purchases made with federal funds
since 2002, when the Act was passed. The fifty states purchased their direct electronic
voting machine separately from the following most frequently named vendors: ES&S
(thirty-nine states), the vendors which were formerly Diebold (thirty-one states), Sequoia
(eighteen states), Hart InterCivic (twelve states). See infra Appendix I; BRENNAN CENTER
TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY:
PROTECTING ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD 2 (2006), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a56eba8edf74e9e12e_r2m6b86s2.pdf (providing a list of certified
vendors).
5
See infra notes 18–26 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
7
Critics of electronic voting machines have identified the transparency, accuracy and
integrity issues existing within direct electronic voting machines. See ERIC A. FISCHER,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ELECTION REFORM AND ELECTRONIC VOTING
SYSTEMS (DRES): ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ISSUES 26 n.101 (2003), http://www.
epic.org/privacy/voting/crsreport.pdf, for a discussion of security issues inherent in the
new electronic voting machines designed to facilitate increased voting with accuracy and
transparency for the populace. See, e.g., BEV HARRIS, BLACK BOX VOTING: BALLOT
TAMPERING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004); AVIEL D. RUBIN, BRAVE NEW BALLOT: THE
BATTLE TO SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING (2006); ROY G.
SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY, IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY
AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (2006); Stephanie Philips, The Risks of Computerized Election
Fraud: When Will Congress Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123
(2006); Tokaji, supra note 2; see also David Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability:
Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2007).
8
Scholars claim that DREs with their inaccessible proprietary source code fail to
provide the accuracy of reliable vote counting necessary for a transparent provision of a
public good—voting. See, e.g., Herbert E. Cihak, The Help America Vote Act: Unmet
Expectations?, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679, 684 (2007) (“It is not apparent that
the EAC, or Congress for that matter, fully understood the nation-wide ramifications of
replacing punch card voting machines, lever voting machines, and paper ballots with
electronic touch screen voting equipment. As early as 1969, studies had surfaced which
indicated that computerized voting presented a whole host of security issues. Coupled
with electronic voting machine security is the issue of electronic machine malfunctions.
A substantial number of voting machine failures were unveiled during the 2006 primary
election season.”); Matthew Fisher, Will Your Vote Count?: Can the Current Software
Withstand and Guarantee the Constitutional Right to Vote?, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 91, 105
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comments have been written critiquing the lack of access to DRE
proprietary software for independent testing and auditing
purposes.9 However, the effect of the DRE vendor oligopoly on
the price and access of DREs in the marketplace has not received
comparable attention.
This Article contends that the lack of access to the proprietary
software in the DREs is a function of market control exercised by
the vendors.10 Furthermore, this Article argues that the DRE
vendors are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma11 concerning access
to proprietary software as a function of the price of the voting

(2008) (“The fear of an outside attack on a DRE voting machine occupies much of the
public alarm over the use of electronic voting. The possibilities for an attack on the
software fit into three main categories, physical, code based, and result alteration.”). But
see Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1716 (opining that DREs are better solutions than the old
paper-based systems).
9
See supra notes 6–8.
10
Joseph Kattan & William R Vigdor, Game Theory and the Analysis of Collusion in
Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 441, 443 n.6 (1997) (“By market
conditions or market characteristics, we refer to all of the factors that bear upon the
ability of firms to achieve, monitor competitors’ adherence to, and punish deviations
from an understanding. These include concentration, information availability and
quality, firm differentiation, cost characteristics, product differentiation or homogeneity,
technological stability, transaction characteristics, trade customs and usages, buyer
characteristics, entry conditions, and the ability of fringe firms to expand, among others.
The terms market conditions or market characteristics are used for convention and are not
intended to suggest that one or more elements of market structure are determinative of
market performance.”).
11
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
two prisoners . . . are being interrogated separately, if each tries to
blame the other, each is sentenced to eight years in prison; if both
remain silent, each is sentenced to one year. If just one blames the
other, he is released, but the silent prisoner is sentenced to ten years.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of a 2 by 2 game, because
each of the two players . . . has two possible actions in his action set:
Confess and Deny. Each player has a dominant strategy.
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 21–20
(4th ed. 2006). This dominant strategy is one designed to maximize the individuals’
outcome in this incarcerated situation. Id. “The Prisoner’s Dilemma crops up in many
different situations, including oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, salesman effort,
political bargaining, and arms races. Whenever you observe individuals in a conflict that
hurts them all, your first thought should be of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Id. at 21.
However, if the two prisoners find a way to co-operate, then their outcome improves. Id.
See infra notes 243–84 for a further explanation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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machines. The dominant (best) strategy12 for each individual DRE
vendor normally would be to provide machines with software
access at a price which maximizes profit. Based upon the demand
by the states, this would be a rational decision on the part of the
DRE vendors. The Nash equilibrium13 best position for each
vendor ordinarily would be to deviate from any agreement among
the vendors and provide access to the software to the voting
public.14
However, as part of an oligopoly, (which acts like a monopoly)
the dominant strategy for the DRE vendors collectively is to
“cooperate” and withhold access to software and maintain market
control over the purchase and sale of the electronic voting
machines.15 Absent careful oversight, a few private interests, the
vendor owners, who preclude access to independent software
12
“A player’s dominant strategy is his strictly best response even to wildly irrational
actions by the other players.” Id. at 20; see also MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY, A
NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1997) (“A strategy in game theory is a complete plan of
action that describes what a player will do under all possible circumstances.”).
13
See infra note 266 for a discussion of the Nash equilibrium; see also Gregory J.
Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law
with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 719, 721 (2004) (“The key equilibrium
concept in oligopoly theory is Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium, which in simple terms
defines an equilibrium as a set of actions by players such that no player has an incentive
to alter its action in light of the actions being taken by the other players. This concept
was introduced by mathematician John F. Nash, Jr. in 1950, and it earned him a share of
the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.”) (citing John Nash, Non-Cooperative
Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951), reprinted in COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 82
(Andrew F. Daughety ed., 1988)).
14
Guy Sagi, The Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy,
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 269, 277 (2008) (“The well known ‘prisoners’ dilemma game,’
represents the basic game theory payoff matrix. The famous paradox of this game is that
both prisoners would have been better off, ex ante, if they could have reached a binding
understanding to cooperate, but nevertheless the ‘Nash equilibrium’ of the game is to
deviate. The classic prisoners’ dilemma game is a static, non-cooperative, one-shotgame. However, when the game repeats itself, the players can potentially establish a
cooperative strategy that will benefit all. Cooperation comes about as a result of the
players’ ability to retaliate in the following rounds if one player deviates from the
mutually beneficial strategy to make a short-term profit. Consequently, deviating might
become an unprofitable strategy.”).
15
Id. (“Oligopoly firms face a situation that resembles a contest or game. Each firm
has to choose a strategy that will maximize its profits, taking into consideration its rivals’
strategies and reactions to the firm’s actions. Each firm’s profit depends upon its rivals
strategies and therefore the logic guiding each firm’s decisions is within the domain of
game theory.”).
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testing could dictate the integrity and security of an American
good: the public vote.16
To help understand and analyze the voting machine oligopoly,
a quick examination of the marketplace looking at Game Theory17
and the conflict between voting rights and intellectual property (or
“IP”) protection follows.
A. The Oligopolistic Marketplace
The term oligopoly is derived from the Greek words meaning a
few sellers.18 Oligopolies are markets where only a few number of
firms operate.19 These markets are not competitive, in that prices
are higher than prices that would occur in competitive markets but
lower than prices occurring in markets with a monopoly.20
16

See infra notes 33–35.
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 3 (“The theory of games is a theory of decision making. It
considers how one should make decisions and to a lesser extent, how one does make
them.”); RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 11 (“Game theory is concerned with the actions of
decision makers who are conscious that their actions affect each other.”). Davis
described the origin of game theory:
The foundations of game theory were laid by John von Neumann,
who in 1928 proved the basic minimax theorem, and with the
publication in 1944 of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
the field was established. It was shown that social events can best be
described by models taken from suitable games of strategy. These
games in turn are amenable to thorough mathematical analysis.
DAVIS, supra note 12, at x.
18
MARIA MOSCHANDREAS, BUSINESS ECONOMICS 148 (2d ed. 1999). The few firms
can either compete ruthlessly or collude and behave like a monopoly. If they collude,
they form a cartel to reduce output and drive up profits the way a monopoly does.
Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 86 (2007).
19
Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86; see also Daniel R. Shulman, Proof of Conspiracy in
Antitrust Cases & the Oligopoly Problem, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 14 (2003) (describing an
oligopoly as “[s]ix or fewer sellers, or in some cases buyers, dominate, and merely
through conscious parallelism are able to set prices without regard to costs or competitive
forces” (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (decrying
practices which impair “the ability of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring
the provision of desired goods and services to consumers at a price approximating the
marginal cost of providing them”))).
20
Id. (“‘Oligopolies’ are markets that contain a small number of firms. Such
concentrated markets are usually ‘imperfectly’ competitive: Oligopoly prices are
generally higher than prices that result from perfect competition but lower than prices
that result under monopoly.”).
17
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Oligopolies are identified by behavior and resulting outcomes. In
an oligopolistic market, the firms are few such that each firm
makes its price and output decisions knowing its individual
decisions will affect the market and cause reactions by other
firms.21 Firms in oligopolies often earn profits higher than
necessary to keep competitive firms in the industry, and they are
not constrained by competition.22 In short, firms in an oligopoly
do not have to accept the prices dictated by the marketplace.23
This Article suggests that not only do the DRE vendors control
the price, but they also prevent the independent review and testing
of their product (voting machines) by precluding software access.
This Article argues that this could only occur through cooperation
and collective action by the vendors. This occurs even though
DRE vendors provide a product traditionally created to be used as
part of a public good (the voting process). As a result the
opportunity for corruption of this public good remains in the hands
of private concerns—an oligopoly fueled by a one-time federal
infusion of capital.
The dictum in a Supreme Court case best summarizes a nonillegal definition of oligopolistic behavior as tacit collusion
between firms:
21

Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86; RESEARCH AND EDUC. ASS’N, ECONOMICS: A
COMPLETE SOLUTION GUIDE TO ANY TEXTBOOK 754 (1980) (“A market has an
oligopolistic structure if actions by one firm have such important effects upon rivals that
these rivals will contemplate appropriate reactions, which may affect the original firm. In
other words, an oligopoly exists when each firm in an industry must contemplate the
possible reactions of its rivals in deciding its own behavior.”).
22
Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86.
23
Id. (“Firms in oligopolies thus often earn profits higher than necessary to keep
competitive firms in the industry and are not constrained, as firms facing perfect
competition are, to accept passively the prices dictated to them by the marketplace. The
key feature of oligopolies, and the one that generates higher profits, is that there are few
enough firms that each firm makes price and output decisions knowing its individual
decisions will affect the market and cause responses by other firms. Anticipation of those
competitive responses may cause a firm to rethink what at first looks like a profitenhancing move.”). “Demand is defined as a schedule which shows the various amounts
of a product which consumers are willing and able to purchase at each specific price in a
set of possible prices during some specified period of time.” RESEARCH AND EDUC.
ASS’N, supra note 21, at 480. Price then is the inverse function of said demand curve or
schedule and represents the “monetary” amount that consumers are willing to pay for a
specific amount of a product during some specified period of time. Id.
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Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price
coordination or conscious parallelism, describes the
process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly
power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,
supra-competitive level by recognizing their shared
economic interests and their interdependence with
respect to price and output decisions.24
DRE vendors, by operating in a concentrated market and
sharing monopoly power, set prices and control output decisions.
Those decisions include preventing access, and possibly
eliminating accuracy in the voting process in order to maximize
supra-competitive profits.25 This Article proposes to show that the
balance of the competing interests of voting liberties and
intellectual property rights is negatively impacted by this
oligopolistic marketplace.
Game theory is a way of organizing a logical method of
analyzing how two actors reach maximization of their profits,
while considering the other firm’s possible reactions and
strategies26 and can be useful in assessing the DRE marketplace.
An analysis of various game theory applications shows that the
dominant strategies for individual electronic voting machine
owners would be to provide access for testing and independent
auditing.27

24

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993).
25
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89
MINN. L. REV. 9, 54. Piraino opines that the structure of oligopoly markets encourages
anti-competitive conduct by allowing the oligopolists to coordinate their behavior to
maintain prices above the normal competitive level.
The weight of economic theory, however, now supports the
conclusion that oligopolies do facilitate supracompetitive pricing. In
1838 Augustin Cournot published one of the first theses on
oligopolistic behavior. In his model, two theoretical oligopolists
calculate their output so that, together, they will be able to achieve a
profit-maximizing price approaching the monopoly level.
Id. at 17.
26
See generally Sagi, supra note 14, at 277.
27
See infra text accompanying note 320.
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In reality the DRE vendors are claiming copyright and trade
secret protection and refusing to provide access or to alter the
machines. Using game theory analysis, this conduct on the part of
the DRE vendors leads to the inevitable conclusion that the
vendors operating in this oligopoly are acting cooperatively and
controlling market access. This constraint against auditing access
occurs against a backdrop of the citizens’ constitutional right to
suffrage versus the intellectual property rights of the authors of the
machines’ source coding.
I. THE CONFLICT: BALANCING THE RIGHT TO VOTE VS.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Two federally protected rights, subsisting within DREs, are
currently in conflict as competing interests.28 The right to vote in
fairly conducted elections and the right to proprietary protection
for IP are headed for a constitutional collision in elections using
DREs.29 As one scholar opines:
DRE voting machine manufacturers utilize
proprietary code because this enables the
manufacturers to take advantage of intellectual
property protections, preventing substantive
oversight. By gaining protection for the software,
28
See Andrew Massey, “But We Have to Protect Our Source!”: How Electronic
Voting Companies Proprietary Code Ruins Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
233, 235 (2004) (identifying the conflict between the federal right to vote and the
intellectual property protections granted to proprietary software in electronic voting
machines).
29
See Doris Estelle Long, Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast
from the Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533, 548–89 (2005) (“Diebold’s use of the DCMA [Digital
Millennium Copyright Act] to prevent the publication of information regarding security
concerns with its voting software puts the Copyright Act on a direct collision course with
the First Amendment. . . . Nothing seems more ‘political’ than information about the
reliability of voting machines, and, ultimately, the fairness of the election process.”);
Massey, supra note 28, at 234. Massey asserts that DREs pit the voting rights of the
public against the proprietary rights of the software owners: “Unlike traditional paperballot systems . . . [DREs] record votes in secret, meaning that the voting public has no
idea whether its vote counted, and if it did count, whether, it went to the person for whom
the voters voted.” Id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1741–94 (providing a critique of
clashing rights within electronic voting machines).
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most likely through copyright the manufacturer of
the DRE machine determines who can legally
access and test the software. Permitting a private
company to exercise complete control over voting
software enables the same private actor to remove
transparency from elections. The DMCA [Digital
Millennium Copyright Act], enacted to update
copyright laws for digital media, could potentially
result in the copyright holder of voting software
preventing any distribution of information about
copyrighted material. The control granted by the
DMCA also permits a software owner to limit
security testing of the software to owners or
operators, precluding the ability of outsiders, who
may have more experience or time, from gauging
the ability of voting software to protect the
information generated during an election.30
Both the right to vote and proprietary intellectual property
rights are sufficiently important to our democracy as to have
achieved federal protection, either in the Constitution or by
congressional action.31 Yet the vendors of DREs and owners of
30

Fisher, supra note 8, at 102; see also Long, supra note 29, at 540 (opining that
proprietary source code with the help of the DMCA are in direct conflict with First
Amendment rights and voting rights).
31
See Trevor Potter & Marianne Holt Viray, Federal Election Authority: Jurisdiction
and Mandates, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN
ELECTION REFORM 102, 103 (Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. McCaffery
eds. 2004) (“The U.S. Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate the times,
places, and manner of federal elections . . . . As a result of this authority, as well as the
authority to ensure equal protection of citizens’ voting rights in state and local elections,
the federal government is already an active participant in establishing election rules on
issues ranging from voter registration to enforcement of equal access to voting booths.”).
See also infra notes 59–132 for a discussion of the right to vote under the Constitution.
Intellectual property protection originates in the Constitution and state and federal
legislation. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause); 17
U.S.C. § 4 (1909 Copyright Protection Act) (providing constitutional protection for
patents and copyrights); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; Act of March 3, 1891,
ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (extending copyright protection to foreign nationals and imposing
copyright registration formalities); WENDY J. GORDON & RICHARD WATT, INTRODUCTION
TO THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS passim
(2003) (providing a discussion of the property rights theories supporting the use of
intellectual property protections); see also infra notes 151–234.
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proprietary software, receiving substantial public funds, have
managed to protect intellectual property rights at the expense of
voting rights.32
The voting rights process in federal elections involves the
provision of a public good,33 which in turn implicates the core
values of citizen participation: transparency and equality of
access.34 Admittedly, intellectual property rights benefiting voting
machine vendor owners may promote innovation, profit

32
See generally Massey, supra note 28, at 235. See Levine, supra note 7, at 138 (“But
in late 2005, potential vendor Diebold . . . focused instead on its commercial property
rights. Rather than comply with the law, it brought a declaratory judgment action against
the state, arguing that it could not supply the required information. Diebold explained
that some of the inner workings of its voting machines were a third party's intellectual
property, likely trade secrets, to which it did not have access. Therefore, Diebold claimed
the information could not be shared with the state or the public without violating
intellectual property rights or intellectual property licensing agreements with third
parties, even if it had access to this information.” (citations omitted)); see also Long,
supra note 29, at 541 (suggesting that the copyright protections of the source code under
the DCMA are in conflict with the constitutional values of political speech and the
integrity of the voting process); Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1779–80 (expressing concerns
about the lack of auditing transparency because of both security and accuracy concerns).
33
See James Love & Tim Hubbarb, Paying For Public Goods, in CODE:
COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed.
2005) (“Among economists, a public good is one that, regardless of its cost to produce, is
not rival in consumption. That is to say, the marginal cost of sharing the good is zero,
and the use of the good by an additional person does not diminish the availability of the
good to others. Another aspect of the economics definition concerns the ability to
prevent others from benefiting from the good—sometimes referred to as non-exclusivity
of consumption.”).
34
Levine, supra note 7, at 136 (“Transparency and accountability, especially in the last
several decades, are among the core values that drive the fundamental model of a
publicly elected and properly operating democratic government.”); see also Massey,
supra note 28, at 235 (“The proprietary nature of the code requires a closed state review
process that has not eliminated serious errors and security flaws because it limits the
number of people testing the software. That closed process also contradicts public policy
and American tradition favoring openness through transparent and accountable
government. As a result, the electorate is forced to rely upon arguably substandard
machines to conduct one of the most important functions of our democratic system.”);
Lilian Mitrou et al., Electronic Voting: Constitutional and Legal Requirements, in
SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING 54 (Dimitris A. Gritzalis ed. 2003) (“A key element of
democratic, free and fair elections is the trust and legitimization that is gained having a
transparent vote casting and counting procedure.”).
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maximization and a dynamic marketplace by securing protection
for software in direct recording voting machines.35
However, intellectual property laws protect the owners of
proprietary software in DREs,36 without adequately safeguarding
the voter’s right to a secure, fair and fraud-free election.37 Despite
reports questioning the security and transparency of electronic
35

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause). In Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court identified one of the principles upon
which the Copyright Clause was based: economics. Id. at 219. The Court opined that the
policy behind the Clause was to promote public welfare through private market
incentives. Id. “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in ‘Science and the useful Arts.’” Id.; see also GORDON & WATT, supra
note 31, at xvi (“In the absence of legal protection, a writer might be afraid of showing
his manuscript to a publisher lest it be copied, without payment . . . without copyright the
situation could resemble a prisoner’s dilemma . . . . So a lack of copyright might lead to
lack of payment and incentives for authors, and thus underproduction.”). See generally
William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 passim (1989).
36
See Fisher, supra note 8, at 102; Massey, supra note 28, at 234–35 (“The source of
this problem is the proprietary source code that drives these paperless electronic voting
machines. Unlike paper-based voting machines, DREs operate entirely by computer,
meaning that at no stage of the election process can the public see the physical counting
of the votes. Absent access to the source code that runs the DRE, the public has no way
of knowing how—or if—the machine records and tabulates votes. As a result, a growing
chorus of critics claim that without the ability to scrutinize the process, the public has no
way to protect against malicious manufacturers, elections officials, or voters from
‘hacking’ the machines to ‘deliver’ votes to their chosen candidates.”).
37
Numerous reports and articles have been written concerning security flaws in DREs.
See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 7; Carrier, supra note 3, at 660 (“Another type of data fraud
targets the record of all cast votes. Anyone with access to this data could alter vote
records and ‘generate or change as many votes as he or she pleased.’ Such votes ‘would
be indistinguishable from the true votes cast on the terminal.’ But despite the critical
importance of the vote records, one single DATA Encryption Standard (“DES”) key,
f2654hD4, has encrypted all of Diebold’s vote records data since 1998.”); Massey, supra
note 28, at 235 (“In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have proven to be errorridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of the code has forced
state agencies to protect manufacturers’ intellectual property at the expense of a reliable
voting system.”); DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (“SERVE”) passim (2004),
http://www.servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf; MICHAEL A. WERTHEIMER, DIEBOLD
ACCUVOTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM passim (2004), http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/
courses/tcr17-803/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf; Massachusetts Institute of Technology
News Office, Voting Technology Fact Sheet, July 16, 2001, http://web.mit.edu/
newsoffice/2001/voting2facts.html.
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voting machines, Congress has failed to enact measures to require
that DREs used in federal elections possess minimum software
security protections.38
In 2002, Congress passed HAVA to encourage states to
upgrade voting technology and to increase the use of electronic
voting machines.39 HAVA funneled over three billion dollars to
states to assist in this technological transition.40 This federal
infusion of monies into the private marketplace created a monetary
incentive for states to purchase new voting machine technology.41
In an effort to address the security issues with DREs, Congress
proposed additional legislation mandating audits and banning the
use of DREs not retrofitted with voter verified paper ballots in

38

See Carrier, supra note 3, at 646–47. Carrier asserts that Congress passed
“‘HAVA,’ which provided $325 million to the states to replace their punch card voting
systems,” but that the Act does not remedy major deficiencies in electronic voting such as
reduced transparency, with the possibilities of hidden trap doors in software eliminating
millions of votes; increased magnitudes of error and fraud; and the lack of security
controls, which “makes it astonishingly easy to change vote totals, register votes for
unintended candidates, prematurely terminate elections, and erase the ‘audit log’ that is
designed to trace such activity.” Id. at 646–47.
39
HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545
(2006)). The bill passed Congress in 2002 in the wake of the presidential election of
2000 where antiquated election administration and technology led to a national crisis
during the election. See Daniel Palazzolo, Vincent G. Moscardelli, Meredith Patrick &
Doug Rubin, Election Reform after HAVA: Voter Verification in Congress and the States,
38 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 515, 515 (2008), available at
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/38/3/515.pdf.
HAVA was designed to
encourage the states to adopt and upgrade their election technology. See supra text
accompanying note 39.
40
See Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 589 (2003)
(“Title I of the Act contains provisions for replacing punch card machines and improving
election administration. The Act allocates $3.86 billion to states and localities to, among
other things, improve the administration of federal elections, educate citizens about
voting rights and procedures, train election officials and poll workers, improve or replace
voting technology, and increase the availability of absentee ballots to overseas military
voters. For the first time, substantial amounts of federal funds will be used to help
finance federal elections.”); 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 22; Tokaji, supra
note 2, at 1733.
41
See Carrier, supra note 3, at 646 (explaining that “[m]any states have
enthusiastically embraced” Congress’s invitation in HAVA by replacing punch cards
with DREs).
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federal elections.42 However, this proposed amendment to HAVA
never passed.
HAVA currently provides only limited safeguards for voter
security. Through copyright43 and trade secret44 protection, DRE
manufacturers protect their software from competition and outside
scrutiny.45
Without access to source code disclosure,46
47
encryption standards and mandated independent random audits,48
42

See S. 1487, 110th Cong. (2007) (Senate bill “[t]o amend the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 to require an individual, durable, voter-verified paper record under title III of
such Act”); H.R. REP. No. 110-154, at 2 (2007) (House Report accompanying “[a] bill to
amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper
ballot under title III of such Act, and for other purposes”). These bills never passed
Congress.
43
See Fisher, supra note 8, at 102 (“By gaining protection for the software, most likely
through copyright, the manufacturer of the DRE machine determines who can legally
access and test the software.”); Long, supra note 29, at 548–49; see also Kevin C. Earle,
No-Copy Technology and the Copyright Act: Has the Music Industry Been Allowed To
Go Too Far In Diminishing The Consumers' Personal Use Rights In The Digital World?,
2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 337, 341–42 (2003) (“Not only does the Federally
codified Copyright Act encourage creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the
public welfare, but it also provides exclusive rights and rewards to the copyright owners.
Thus, the Copyright Act was drafted to balance certain public interests by granting access
to protected copyright materials while simultaneously reserving certain proprietary rights
to authors of original works.”).
44
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 617–18 (3d ed. 2004) (defining a trade secret as “[b]usiness
information that is the subject of reasonable efforts to preserve confidentiality and has
value because it is not generally known in the trade” and noting that “[s]uch confidential
information will be protected against those who obtain access through improper methods
or by a breach of confidence”); see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND
INTERNET LAW 4 (3d ed. 2006) (“One way for vendors to prevent users from freely
copying their computer programs was to claim a program as a trade secret.”); infra notes
203–30.
45
See Massey, supra note 28, at 241–44.
46
See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE
746–47 (2004) (“‘Although ‘source code’ has been defined far more broadly in some of
the literature in the field, and in some of the expert testimony in this case, more
commonly the term ‘source code’ refers to a computer program written in some
programming language . . . that uses complex symbolic names, along with complex rules
of syntax.’” (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44
(D. Mass. 1990))).
47
See EPIC CRYPTOGRAPHY & LIBERTY SOURCEBOOK 1997 E-30 (David Banisar ed.,
7th ed. 1997) (“Through the use of cryptography, communication and information stored
and transmitted by computers can be protected against interception . . . . Modern
encryption technology—a mathematical process involving the use of formulas or
algorithms—was traditionally deployed most widely to protect the confidentiality of
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proposed DRE legislation fails to provide for a fair, accurate and
reliable voting system.49
Scholars have argued for the use of voter verified paper trails
(or “VVPTs”) in the voting process.50 VVPTs require that the
voting machine issue a paper receipt indicating how a voter cast
her ballot. In the absence of public bid procedures for open source
software51 in DREs, VVPTs simply do not offer a solution to the
military and diplomatic communications. With the advent of the computer revolution
and recent innovations in the science of encryption, a new market for cryptographic
products has developed.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(3) (2006) (defining “encryption”
as “to transmit such programming in a form whereby the aural and visual characteristics
(or both) are modified or altered for the purpose of preventing the unauthorized receipt of
such programming by persons without authorized equipment which is designed to
eliminate the effects of such modification or alteration”).
48
See Carrier, supra note 3, at 654–56 (“The completely paperless nature of DREs,
along with the role of computers in each stage of the vote counting process, ensures that,
of the five types of voting technologies, DRE fraud is least likely to be detected and most
likely to have vast effects. In addition, DRE fraud is possible at each stage of the voting
process: before the election (through physically unsecured machines), during voting
(through smartcards that allow voters to gain unauthorized access), and after votes have
been cast (through votes that are misrecorded when registered or tabulated). . . . For all
of these reasons, the testing and certification process is critical. Nonetheless, this process
is flawed. For starters, there is a ‘stunning lack of transparency’ surrounding testing and
certification, which the companies complete in secret and refuse even to discuss.”).
49
See Massey, supra note 28, at 235 (“In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have
proven to be error-ridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of
the code has forced state agencies to protect manufacturers’ intellectual property at the
expense of a reliable voting system.”). Massey argues for the mandated “use of open
source code to ensure transparency and accountability mandated by law. In addition,
states must eliminate escrow requirements to allow for public testing of the source code.”
Id. at 236.
50
See Carrier, supra note 3, at 647 (proposing “electronic voting machines[,] a voterverified paper trail, random audits, open source software, [and] more robust certification”
for the DREs).
51
STEPHEN J. DAVIDSON, STUART D. LEVI & LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE 2007: RISKS, REWARDS AND PRACTICAL REALITIES IN THE CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENT 128 (2004) (“‘Open Source Software is software for which the underlying
programming code is available to the users so that they may read it, make changes to it,
and build new versions of the software incorporating their changes. There are many
types of Open Source Software, mainly differing in the licensing term under which
(altered) copies of the source code may (or must) be redistributed.’” (citation omitted)).
Open source software is typically distributed under two kinds of
licenses: BSD or GPL. Under the BSD license, a user may modify,
recompile, and distribute the source code, so long as the original
copyright is acknowledged. By contrast, under the GPL license, a
user may likewise modify, recompile and distribute the source code,
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problem of privately held software lacking independent access for
review.52
As the authors of the Brennan Center for Justice, Election
Results noted:
The widespread adoption of voter-verifiable paper
records does not, however, resolve the security,
reliability, and verifiability issues with electronic
voting that many groups, including the Brennan
Center, have identified. To the contrary, as the
Brennan Center noted in its June 2006
comprehensive study of electronic voting system
security The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting
Elections in an Electronic World, voter-verifiable
paper records by themselves are “of questionable
security value.” Paper records will not prevent
programming errors, software bugs or the
introduction of malicious software into voting
systems. If paper is to have any real security value,
it must be used to check, or “audit,” the voting
system’s electronic records.53
DREs store votes electronically, with the votes being submitted
periodically throughout the election or collected on data storage
cards.54 This information is transmitted over a network connection
or via Internet to a central location for tallying.55 A software
malfunction could trigger a number of problems including shutting
but does not have to acknowledge a copyright, and more importantly,
cannot claim any copyright for the altered source code. The GPL
license is the more prevalent of the two schemes, and is used in the
popular Linux operating system to facilitate input from programmers
interested in improving the system.
Massey, supra note 28, at 240 n.39.
52
See Massey, supra note 28, at 236 (arguing that the VVPT is subject to the same
risks as existing paper based voting systems and “does nothing to further the general goal
of restoring legitimacy to voting”).
53
LAWRENCE NORDEN, AARON BURSTEIN, JOSEPH LORENZO HALL & MARGARET CHEN,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS
2 (2007), http://electionaudits.org/files/Brennan%20Center%20Report%20on%20PostElection%20Audits.pdf.
54
See Fisher, supra note 8, at 96.
55
See Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1777.
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down, counting two votes for every one vote and erasing entire
numbers of votes from designated precincts. A VVPT could not
assure that the all votes are counted or even counted accurately.56
As a result of the current proprietary protection for electronic
voting machine software, a few private interests57 could dictate the
security and integrity of American federal elections. The result: an
oligopolistic control of a public good—the democratic election
process.58
This Article will examine the interplay between the oligopoly
held by DRE vendors, the intellectual property rights subsisting
within the electronic voting machines, and the conflict between
fundamental voting rights. This Article proposes to do so by: (1)
reviewing the right to vote and its place as a fundamental liberty;
(2) examining the IP rights within DREs (copyrights and trade
secrets); and (3) analyzing the marketplace for the oligopolistic
effects of the DRE vendors.
Ultimately this Article argues that intellectual property
(copyright and trade secret) protections for voting machine
software undermine the gains made by voting rights advocates
during the past forty years. More specifically, this Article
contends that the creation of this oligopoly produces a market
inefficiency (eliminating transparency, accuracy and voter
participation) which prevents the public from controlling a public
good and reaching a satisfactory balance between the two
important interests.59

56

See NORDEN ET AL., supra note 53, at 46–59.
The major vendors of digital recording voting machines include the following firms:
ES&S, Premier, Sequoia, Hart InterCivic, MicroVote, Advanced. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
58
See Massey, supra note 28, at 235.
59
See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Paradox of Mass Democracy, in RETHINKING THE VOTE:
THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 210, 210 (Ann N.
Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. McCaffery eds. 2004) (“Most of us agree, however,
that any truly democratic system must at a minimum meet three necessary conditions: (1)
relatively wide, if not universal, suffrage; (2) a great degree of equality among those
allowed to vote; and, perhaps most controversially; (3) some degree of thoughtfulness
among voters.”).
57
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II. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE
RIGHT TO VOTE
The right to vote in a fairly conducted election is a
constitutionally protected feature of United States citizenship.60
Congress has the power to regulate federal elections pursuant to
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution (the Elections
Clause)61 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (the Necessary and
Proper Clause).62 Based upon the utilization of voters’ registration
requirements for federal elections, which are co-extensive with
state election registration requirements and election processes, the
federal guarantees for a fairly conducted election have been
broadened to include state and local election processes.63
A number of constitutional amendments and attendant statutes
create and protect the right to vote.64 Carved out of historical
60

See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Supreme Court in
Reynolds invalidated an apportionment scheme in the state of Alabama. Id. at 568. The
Court held that the right to vote was a fundamental interest based upon the fact that the
right to vote preserves all other rights. Id. at 560. The Court held that the apportionment
scheme, which relied on a sixty year old census, diluted a citizen’s right to vote based
strictly on residency. Id. at 562. This dilution was deemed to be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 568. The Court struck down the
apportionment scheme and required that a bicameral system for apportionment be
instituted such that representation be based on “one person, one vote.” Id. at 587.
Reynolds was historic for its use of federalism to enforce a right to vote within a state
election system. See id. at 574.
61
See U.S CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Place of Chusing Senators.”); see also id. art. II, § 1 (providing for states to choose
electors for President and Vice-President).
62
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
63
See CRAIG C. DONSANTO, IFES POLITICAL SCIENCE WHITE PAPER SERIES,
PROSECUTION OF ELECTORAL FRAUD UNDER UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW 3,
http://www.moneyandpolitics.net/researchpubs/pdf/IFES_Nigeria_fraud_paper.pdf
(explaining that the federal jurisdictional prerequisite is satisfied when a federal
candidate is on the ballot or conduct occurs which impacts the voter registration process
for a federal election or in a state where a person registers to vote simultaneously for
federal as well as state and local offices).
64
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV; id. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (2006)
(“Denial or Abridgement of Right to Vote on Account of Race or Color Through Voting
Qualifications or Prerequisites; Establishment of Violation”); id. § 1973gg-9 (“Civil
Enforcement and Private Right of Action”). The 1965 Voting Rights Act (or “VRA”)
was hotly contested and fiercely litigated. See generally American Civil Liberties Union,
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movements for suffrage, protections for the right to vote have been
addressed extensively by the Supreme Court.65
ACLU
Voting
Rights
Project
Litigation,
http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/
gen/36949res20080929.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The VRA contains what is
known as a preclearance requirement. The preclearance provisions (commonly known as
“section 5 Preclearance”) require certain jurisdictions that used a discriminatory test or
device for voting and in which voter registration or voting was depressed to preclear all
their proposed changes in voting laws or practices. See Laughlin McDonald, Racial
Fairness—Why Shouldn’t It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 847, 848 (1992) (“Preclearance requires these jurisdictions to prove to federal
officials that the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
discriminating on account of race or color or membership in a language minority. Voting
changes that are denied preclearance are ineffective as law and are unenforceable.”).
Other provisions of the Act include: 42 U.S.C. § 1973, prohibiting
voting practices that ‘result’ in discrimination; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b,
abolishing ‘tests or devices’ for voting; 42 U.S.C. § 1973j,
establishing criminal penalties for violations of the Act; 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-6, establishing the right of disabled or illiterate persons to
receive assistance in voting; 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1, abolishing
durational residency requirements and establishing uniform standards
for absentee voting in presidential elections; 42 U.S.C. § 1973d, f,
providing for the appointment of federal examiners and observers;
and, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, 1973aa-1a, providing for special assistance
to language minorities.
Id. at 852 n.35; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibits denial based on sex); id.
amend. XXIV (eliminates poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (provides suffrage to persons
eighteen years or older).
65
See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980) (upholding the
constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and banning electoral changes which
have both the intent and effect of discriminating against African Americans); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 630, 633 (1969) (eliminating property requirements
for eligibility to vote in a school district); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47
(1966) (upholding the validity of 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act banning
discrimination in voting); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 667 (1966)
(holding states have the authority to establish the basic terms of voting conditions, but
conditions that burden the franchise of voting will be “carefully and meticulously
scrutinized” and that wealth is not a qualification for voting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 197–98 (1962) (subjecting district gerrymandering to federal court scrutiny and
holding that it presented a justiciable question where voting issues are impacted); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 322, 325 (1944) (finding that a vote is entitled to
constitutional protection and a person cannot be denied that right to vote in a primary
election and then have his vote count in a federal election); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (holding that the right to vote although not mentioned in the
Constitution is a right which preserves all other rights); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER,
STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONALD E. LIVELY & WENDY B. SCOTT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 561 (2006) (“Notably missing
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ambit of concern, as initially framed, was the right to
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The phrase “right to vote” is not found in the United States
Constitution.66 Yet the right to vote is a fundamental liberty under
which all other rights are exercised as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Reynolds v. Sims67 and Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections.68 Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, the Harper Court held that the right to vote is fundamental
and entitled to a strict scrutiny review because it protects all other
rights.69 The Reynolds Court held that the right to vote freely for
the candidate of one’s choice is the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of a
representative government.70 At issue in Reynolds v. Sims was the
state of Alabama’s apportionment scheme and whether it
constituted discrimination under the Equal Protection clause.71
The Court scrutinized restrictions on the right to vote and
articulated that
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since the
right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized.72
Congress also has the power to provide states with federal
funds to implement federal acts, such as those protecting the right
to vote, through Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 (the General

vote. Its omission reflected the reality that the constitutional impact would touch not
only the South but the North.”). See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION (1999) (discussing voting rights, historical challenges and racially
institutionalized discrimination practices affecting minorities in America).
66
See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
67
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
68
Harper, 383 U.S. at 665–66.
69
See id. at 667; Karyn L. Bass, Notes and Comments, Are We Really Over the Hill
Yet? The Voting Rights Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement
in the Wake of Election 2000 and Bush v. Gore, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 134–35 (2004).
70
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
71
Id. at 536–37.
72
Id. at 561–62.
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Welfare or Spending Clause).73
The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Spending Clause to mean that Congress can provide
funds to a state in a conditional manner to encourage state conduct
in a particular area.74 In South Dakota v. Dole,75 the Court
identified three requirements for Congressional appropriations
pursuant to the Welfare Clause: Congress may provide federal
funds to encourage state action when (1) the spending provides for
the “general welfare” of the people; (2) Congress clearly specifies
qualifications for receipt of the federal funding; and (3) the
conditions of the funding clearly relate to the intent of the
spending.76 This Spending Clause and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation laid, in part, the foundation for Congressional
implementation of HAVA, implemented to establish standards for
states in the administration of federal elections.77
In Buckley v. Valeo,78 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Congressional action to use its spending power
“as a means to reform the electoral process.”79 Following Buckley,
the Supreme Court as recently as Bush v. Gore80 recognized that
the federal government has the constitutional authority to exercise
regulatory power over state and local administration of federal
elections.81
73

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the
. . . general Welfare of the United States . . . .”); see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at
105.
74
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
75
Id,
76
Id. at 207–08; see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 105.
77
HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545
(2006)) (stating in the preamble that the law was enacted “to establish minimum election
administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for
the administration of Federal elections”).
78
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
79
Id. at 90; see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 105.
80
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
81
Id. at 110. In Bush, the Supreme Court re-articulated an equal protection argument
protecting the fundamental right to vote:
[T]he right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental . . .
. The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of
the franchise. Equal protection applies as well as to the manner of its
exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person’s vote over that of another.
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The constitutional source of authority granted to the federal
government to regulate and protect the right to vote in federal
elections can be found in at least seven separate places.82
Unfortunately, even with constitutional authority, voting as
universal suffrage did not occur easily in the United States. The
history of America is replete with instances of overt aggressions
against distinct vulnerable populations83 precluding their
participation in the democratic government. Perhaps none more
identifiable with exclusion than the era of slavery, enforced
servitude and exclusion from public participation as citizens
targeted towards African-Americans.84 Initially the Thirteenth
Amendment, designed to eliminate and release African-Americans
from the horrors of slavery, did not provide the newly freed
African-American with suffrage.85
Congress enacted three subsequent constitutional amendments
which directly impacted the right to vote for citizens. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution86 contains the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses which provided the
Id. at 104 (paragraphing omitted).
82
These places include U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (the Elections Clause); id. § 8, cl.
1 (the General Welfare or Spending Clause); id. cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause);
id. amend. XIV (the Enforcement Clause); id. amend. XV (prohibiting denial of the right
to vote on the basis of race); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial based on sex); id. amend.
XXIV (prohibiting denial based on the payment of a poll tax); id. amend. XXVI
(providing suffrage to persons eighteen and older); see Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at
103.
83
Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 431–32 (2006) (“In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the westward expansion of the new nation ‘brought mass destruction
to the American Indian population.’ But the legitimating frames remained largely intact
under the doctrine of ‘Manifest Destiny,’ which ‘saw the Indian’s decline as an inevitable
consequence of his racial and cultural weakness and the white man’s vigor.’ It was ‘our
manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free
development of our . . . multiplying . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
84
Id. at 432 (“During much of the time that Native Americans were being forced out
of our young nation, an African slave population was being forced in.”).
85
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
86
Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”); id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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main protections for the right to vote.87 The Equal Protection
Clause grants Congress the power to enforce the right to vote. It
elucidates the power of the federal government by legislative and
judicial means to enforce the fundamental liberties of citizenship.88
The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution89 was
enacted in 1870 to prohibit state impediments which denied a
person the right to vote on the basis of color or race.90 The
southern states and individuals immediately engaged in acts and
assaults which included poll taxes, literacy tests, disqualifications,
intimidation, and terrorist acts designed to deprive African
Americans of the right to vote.91 The Nineteenth Amendment92
granted suffrage to women after a period of intense civil activity
and political pressure in 1924.93
87

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (2d
ed. 2002) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868 largely to protect the rights
of newly freed slaves and in its most important provisions says that no state can deny any
person of equal protection of the laws or of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.”); see also Crawford v. Marion, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1611 (2008) (upholding an
Indiana statute requiring government issued photo identification to vote as a sufficient
means to justify any limitation imposed on voters); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–10
(2000) (using an equal protection analysis to protect the fundamental right to vote).
88
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
89
Id. amend. XV.
90
Id. (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”).
91
See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68, at
1–22 (2006) (detailing the violent struggles of civil rights workers against state led voting
rights suppression which culminated in the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act);
DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE, THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW
WORLD 327 (2006) (“The tragic collapse of America’s postwar Reconstruction, which the
racist North never seriously supported, led in the South to a long era of Jim Crow
discrimination that relied, like slavery, on the fear and terror of institutionalized physical
violence.”); Bass, supra note 69, at 116 (“In direct response to the post-Civil War
amendments, the South enacted a number of ‘legal and extralegal’ reforms to limit the
political power of freed black men and to enable the Southern caste system to continue.
Strategic tools were employed . . . district gerrymandering, purposeful closing of black
polling places, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and above all else, waves of
Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the form of lynchings and vigilante violence against blacks
and white civil rights activists in the South.”).
92
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
93
Id. “The Constitution as originally drafted and ratified had no provisions ensuring
equal protection of the laws. This, of course, is not surprising for a document written for
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This era, when coupled with the overt hostility towards
American (Native) Indians and the removal of and land acquisition
from native Latinos in the early settlement of the Southwest,
reflects a period of racial animus, in conflict with the democratic
principles of inclusion and equality.94 Consequently, the civil
rights movement, emergent in the 1940s, identified as one of its
principle goals the pursuit of the right to vote for all citizens, with
the attendant democratic attributes of inclusion, access and
equality.95

a society where blacks were enslaved and where women were routinely discriminated
against.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 642. “The Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in
1920, extended the right to vote to women and says that the ‘right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex.’” Id. at 842.
94
Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S-Mexican Border: Tracing the
Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283 (2003) (“The conquest of Mexico
between 1846 and 1848 has largely disappeared from public consciousness as a
significant historical event with contemporary consequences. Yet this conquest resulted
in the annexation by the United States of approximately one-half of former Mexico,
constituting most of the current southwestern United States.”). Perea further asserts:
Anglo-Americans together with Mexican Tejans fought a war of
independence from Mexico in 1835. Stephen Austin [Texan patriot]
described the war in racial terms: “A war of extermination is raging
in Texas—a war of barbarism and despotic principles, waged by the
mongrel Spanish-Indian and negro race against civilization and the
Anglo-American race.”
Id. at 290 (citations omitted); see also SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 66.
95
See SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 137 (“An initiating factor [for the passage of the
Voting Rights Amendment] was the heightened demand on the part of the black
community of the South that their second-class citizenship be brought to an end [known
as the civil rights movement] . . . . The problem of African Americans in the South was
not only their inability to vote; it was the pervasive segregation that resulted in inferior
treatment in almost every aspect of life.”).
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During the civil rights era,96 marked by sweeping civil
disobedience and major pressure from civil rights activists, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) was passed.97 The VRA
addressed discriminatory election practices aimed at the exclusion
of racial groups from the voting process.98 “The VRA and
subsequent amendments established minority voting rights and
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, language or
color.”99
North American voting rights jurisprudence has a long and
storied history. From elucidating an articulated “right to vote” to

96
Id. (describing a nationwide effort to obtain “civil rights” for all citizens irrespective
of race, color, creed or nationality).
It is not possible . . . to graphically detail the events of the 1950s and
1960s that led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . . Despite the Supreme Court
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954 that school
segregation was inherently unequal, little had changed in the years
immediately afterward. The Birmingham, Alabama, bus boycott,
triggered by Rosa Park’s refusal to give up her seat to a white man,
had occurred in 1955. The following years were filled with
demonstrations—“sit ins” that attempted to desegregate restaurants
and restrooms, demands for “try on” privileges in clothing stores, and
violent reactions by some whites. Some blacks who had attempted to
register to vote were summarily dismissed, others were shot down . . .
.
Id.
97
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at
108 (“The VRA and subsequent amendments established minority voting rights and
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, language, or color. It abolished
the use of literacy tests, ‘good character’ vouchers, and voter requirements impeding the
right to vote, and it granted language minorities the right to register and vote in their own
languages. The VRA also enabled voters to challenge discriminatory voting practices.”
(citations omitted)).
98
SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 137 (“While the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts
were intended to end the unconscionable discrimination against African Americans, the
elimination of voting restrictions due to race would apply also to American Indians,
Alaskan Natives, and Asian Americans.”).
99
Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 108 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973); see SALTMAN,
supra note 7, at 141 (“The original Act of 1965 was prefaced with the explanation that it
was ‘An Act to enforce the 15th Amendment to the constitution of the United States, and
for other purposes.’”). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See SALTMAN, supra
note 7, at 143.
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prohibiting unconstitutional state action, the federal courts
ultimately forged a protectionist stance towards voting as a
fundamental right and individual liberty.100 In the twentieth
century, impediments or restrictions on voting rights by a state
were subjected to strict scrutiny and review by the federal courts.
Routine election disputes, however, were subjected to a balancing
test with a sliding scale of review required by the courts.101 State
election administration and efficiency were considered to be the
province of the individual states where very little federal
intervention occurred.102
In 2000, a controversial presidential election would change all
of that, bringing the federal government into a statewide
election.103 The controversial Bush v. Gore104 ruling was the result
100

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 842 (“In addition . . . the Supreme Court repeatedly
has declared that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected under equal protection
. . . . Thus it is clearly established that laws infringing on the right to vote must meet
strict scrutiny.”).
101
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), for a less strict balancing test for
voting restrictions imposed by a state where the restrictions are not onerous and the state
has a legitimate interest in the regulation thereof. Burdick
requires courts to conduct a threshold balancing of the challenged
law’s burden on voters against the importance of the purported state
interest at stake: if the burden is heavy and the state interest slight,
the law is reviewed under the . . . standard of strict scrutiny . . . while
if the burden is slight and the state interest significant, the law is
examined under the easily met rational basis standard.
Id.; see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that
Virginia’s poll tax was unconstitutional as inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause).
102
See Bass, supra note 69, at 138. Bass analyzed the level of scrutiny applied to such
cases:
Arguably, the level of scrutiny in federal voting rights cases should
be strict because of the fundamental interest involved. However,
with the current Supreme Court ever-watchful of federalism, it has
waffled on the scrutiny applied to more nuanced voting rights cases,
thus making it difficult to draw a line between when strict scrutiny is
triggered and when some lesser level of scrutiny is sufficient.
Id.; see Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a
Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1177 (2007) (“Burdick emphasized voting
as an individually held right and proceeded to evaluate whether that right was burdened
by the state law.” (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)).
103
See Bass, supra note 69, at 137 (“The level of scrutiny applicable to Voting Rights
Act claims, in light of Bush v. Gore, focuses on the remedial avenues available to citizens
whose right to franchise has been abridged. The expansive view of voting in Bush has
opened a window of possibility. The Court opened the opportunity by applying a novel
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of a close presidential race in 2000 between Vice-President Albert
Arnold Gore, Jr. and Texas Governor George W. Bush.105 The
election was held on November 7, 2000.106 The next day, Bush
was reported to have been the winner.107 The difference in Florida
votes between Bush and Gore was less than one percent.108 With
less than one half of a percent of the vote separating the
candidates, Florida law provided for a recount.109 Gore asked for
the recount in four counties.110 However, the Florida Secretary of
State refused to extend the deadline for the recount past November
14, 2001.111
The election was certified on November 26, 2000, naming
Bush the winner.112 Gore filed a contest under Florida law that a
state court denied and dismissed.113 The Florida Supreme Court
reversed in part, ordering a manual recount in all counties where a
recount had not been held.114
equal protection analysis, with no legal precedent, to the fairness in a state’s mechanisms
and procedures of the fundamental right to vote.”); Carrier, supra note 3, at 646. See
Paul Charton, Frying Pan or Fire: Legal Fallout from the Contested 2000 Presidential
Election, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (2007) for a summary of books
and articles describing the 2000 presidential election including: BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Erwin
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2002);
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219
(2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from
Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001). See also National Archives and
Records Administration, 2000 Presidential Election: Popular Vote Totals,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular_vote.html (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009).
104
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
105
Bass, supra note 69, at 126.
106
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 860.
107
Id.
108
Id. (“On November 8, the Florida Division of Elections reported that Bush had
received 2,909,135 votes and Gore had received 2,907,351 votes.”).
109
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000)).
110
Id.
111
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Richard L. Hasen, After the Storm: The Uses, Normative Implications, and
Unintended Consequences of Voting Reform Research in Post-Bush v. Gore Equal
Protection Challenges, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF
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The Florida Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial
court.115 A second trial judge ordered the manual recounts to
begin.116 Bush filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and a stay in
the U.S. Supreme Court.117 The recounts were underway when the
Supreme Court stayed the Florida Supreme Court’s order,
suspended the recount and decided to hear the Florida
controversy.118 The parties had effectively turned an election
dispute occurring within a state into a matter for the federal
judiciary to resolve.119
As the presidency hung in the balance, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to answer questions of law regarding the
constitutional issues raised by the Florida election crisis. . . .
[including] “[w]hether the Florida Supreme Court established new
standards for resolving Presidential election contests, thereby
violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and
failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the standardless
manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.”120
The Supreme Court held that the recount mechanism utilized
by the Florida Supreme Court failed and “[did] not satisfy the
minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right” to vote pursuant to the
Equal Protection Clause.121 The Supreme Court utilized an equal
protection standard by stating that “the right to vote as the
legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote
and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”122 Despite later

AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 185, 190 (Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J.
McCaffery eds. 2004).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1725.
120
Bass, supra note 69, at 130–31 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000)).
121
Bush, 531 U.S. at 105. See Hasen, supra note 114, for a recap of the 2000
presidential election disputes.
122
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
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vociferous criticism of the Court’s reasoning,123 the Court used an
equal protection platform to expand oversight of the electoral
process, and held that whenever a particular voting procedure
effectively “value[s] one person’s vote over that of another” there
appears to be a plausible claim for an equal protection violation.124
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court has articulated a
new equal protection analysis for garden-variety election
disputes.125 At first blush, it would appear that in Bush v. Gore the
Supreme Court mandated the use of the equal protection strict
scrutiny test for voting claims as opposed to the balancing test
outlined in Burdick v. Takusi.126
Although it is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court
will continue to analyze voting disputes using the strict scrutiny
test, a recent case seems to indicate that the Court will use the
balancing analysis in assessing burdens on the right to vote. In
Crawford v. Marion,127 an equal protection challenge to a voter
identification law that required voters to show proof of eligibility
to register and to vote, the Supreme Court went back to a balancing
test analysis.128 In Crawford the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
balancing approach initially outlined in Anderson v. Celebrezze129:
In Anderson v. Celebrezze . . . we confirmed the
general rule that “evenhanded restrictions that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral
123
See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2002).
124
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05.
125
Hasen, supra note 114, at 191–93.
126
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992). Burdick calls for “application of
a deferential, ‘important regulatory interests’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory
restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.”
Crawford v. Marion, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). Burdick
requires the courts to use a balancing test which requires the courts to conduct a threshold
balancing analysis of the challenged law’s burden on the voters against the importance of
the state’s interest. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see also supra note 101.
127
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610.
128
In Crawford the Court held that the states’ interests in deterring and detecting voter
fraud, and participating in an effort to modernize election procedures and safeguard voter
confidence were sufficiently weighty to justify under an equal protection standard any
limitation (such as requiring voters to produce government issued IDs) imposed on the
voters. Id. at 1617–19.
129
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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process itself” are not invidious and satisfy the
standard set forth in Harper [v. Virginia Board of
Elections]. Rather than applying any “litmus test”
that would neatly separate valid from invalid
restrictions, [in Anderson] we concluded that a court
must identify and evaluate the interests put forward
by the State as justifications for the burden imposed
by its rule, and then make the “hard judgment” that
our adversary system demands.130
In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court did not rule on whether the
use of inaccurate voting equipment violated equal protection. The
Court did identify the technology used in the voting process as an
issue for legislative bodies to examine for improvement.131
As the 2000 presidential election drama played out in Florida,
clamors for Congress to take action arose. Bush v. Gore may not
be the precedent-setting case which resurrected judicial review of
strict scrutiny for all state action concerning voting rights.132
However, the 2000 controversial presidential election and its
judicial progeny—Bush v. Gore—were catalysts for HAVA, which
mandated improved technology for the states handling federal
elections. HAVA also provided the monies for upgrading voting
systems that fueled the current voting machine vendor oligopoly.
III. HAVA AND THE PROVISION OF FUNDS
Nearly thirty-seven years after the passage of the VRA, and
against the backdrop of the controversial 2000 presidential
elections, Congress passed HAVA in November 2002. The Act
was designed to incentivize states to improve election-system

130
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) and Anderson, 460 U.S. 780).
131
Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1725 (“What is significant about the opinion, for purposes of
understanding the subsequent changes in voting technology, is its recognition that the
election exposed a serious but previously overlooked problem in need of attention.”).
132
Hasen, supra note 114, at 191–93.
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standards,133 by encouraging states to upgrade their voting
systems.134 The Act:
•
•

•

•
•

•
•

Authorizes $650 million to purchase punch card
voting machines from the states;
Creates an Election Assistance Commission to
serve as a national clearinghouse for
information and review of procedures for
federal elections;
Allocates $3.86 billion in election fund
payments to the states over four years to help
finance a variety of election improvement
projects;
Establishes minimum standards for state
election systems and directs the Department of
Justice to monitor and enforce these standards;
Creates the Help America Vote Foundation and
College Program to encourage college students
to assist in the administration of state and local
elections;
Mandates provisional ballots by 2004 and
statewide computerized voter database by 2006;
and
Reduces postage rates for official election
mail.135

HAVA as a guideline for selecting the most reliable electronic
voting machines for federal elections was and remains woefully

133

HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545
(2006)); see also Carrier, supra note 3, at 646 (“The 2000 presidential election had a
searing effect on this nation. Few who witnessed the events in Florida could displace the
images of election officials peering at punch cards, struggling to determine the intent of
voters. Congress, for example, did not forget. Congress did not wish to see the scenes
from Florida replayed in future elections. And so, in 2002, it enacted the Help America
Vote Act, known as ‘HAVA . . . .’”); Potter & Viray, supra note 31, at 110; Steven
Ramirez & Aliza Organick, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Race and the Integrity of
Democracy in America, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 427, 435 (2007) (“[HAVA] was passed as a
response to the controversies surrounding the presidential election of 2000.”).
134
Lillie Coney, A Call for Election Reform, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 183, 184–85
(2005).
135
Hasen, supra note 114, at 110.
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inadequate.136 Although HAVA “provides substantial funding to
upgrade voting technology and make other improvements in voting
systems,” it unfortunately “provides [only] limited guidance on
what type of voting equipment should be implemented, with few
binding mandates.”137
Significantly, HAVA provides few protections for voting rights
against tampering, mistakes and frauds which could occur on an
electronic voting machine with copyright and trade secretprotected proprietary software.138 The Act does not require
verified voter paper trails to ensure against hacking or computer
malfunctions.139
HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission
(“EAC”) without granting any enforcement or regulatory
powers.140 The EAC has no power to issue any rules and
136

Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 435 (“In general ‘HAVA provided money
and imposed some very general standards, while leaving most of the details of election
administration to the states and counties.’ In other words, ‘Congress effectively punted.’
. . . HAVA also appears to attempt to resolve issues of auditability. . . . Specifically, the
Act requires that the voting system produce a record of audit capacity. In addition,
HAVA mandates a ‘permanent paper record’ but provides no clarification to states as to
what that ‘permanent paper record’ should record. Nor is there a definition of what is
being audited.”).
137
Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1734.
138
See SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 196.
This groundbreaking Act of Congress (Public Law 107-252, October
29, 2002) was adopted almost two years after the 2000 general
election. The Act has been called ‘an anemic piece of legislation’ . . .
but, considering the situation beforehand, it was a giant step forward.
. . . Establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
was a core decision of the act . . . .
Id. Saltman contends that the Commission has limited authority and no regulatory
enforcement powers. Id. at 196–97.
139
See Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 437 (calling the failure to address this
shortcoming of HAVA “a ticking time bomb”); supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
140
See Ramirez & Organick, supra note 133, at 437 (“Nor can the EAC [Commission]
remedy this confounding statute. Instead, HAVA strips the EAC of any regulatory
power; it is a mere funding authority and advisory commission. The Act specifies that
the EAC shall not have any new governmental power to ‘issue any rule, promulgate any
regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit
of local government.’”). The EAC can only promulgate advisory standards concerning
DREs and software security. Id. at 436; see SALTMAN, supra note 7, at 196
(“Establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was a core decision of the
act. . . . The commission has no federal regulatory authority . . . .”).
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regulations, or to take any actions which impose requirements on
any State.141
There are no mandatory basic encryption standards for the
transmission of votes or the use of vote recording equipment in
HAVA.142 Nor are there any regulatory provisions requiring
software owners to allow access to their proprietary software for
independent testing or auditing by citizens, or non-governmental
entities.143 With increased funding for upgrades to voting
procedures, states have adopted and implemented the use of DREs
in large numbers.
Unfortunately HAVA—the only federal
legislation designed to regulate DREs—fails to provide basic
protections for the public’s right to transparency and security in the
electronic voting process.144
HAVA was designed to encourage a state to improve its
election system standards and thereby encourage the use of
electronic voting machines.145 HAVA funneled money to states to
purchase and use electronic voting machines.146 Yet HAVA fails
to adequately provide needed protections required for the efficient
provision of this public good—accuracy, transparency and security

141

Ramirez & Organick, supra note 134, at 437.
See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–
545 (2006)).
143
See id.
144
See William A. Wright, Comment, Public Access to Vote-Counting Software, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 547 (1995) (providing a discussion on the technology of vote counting
software). Wright argues that the current and “suggested security provisions” in votecounting software do not adequately assure accurate and fair vote counting and that they
are not consistent with a public policy of access to vote counting software. Id. at 548; see
also Cihak, supra note 8, at 685 (“As the 2006 election year cycle unfolded, it became
increasingly clear that in addition to problems with the installation of new electronic
voting equipment, there were other difficulties which plagued the implementation of two
more key state HAVA provisions: procedures for the administration of elections and
issues dealing with voting accessibility for several population groups.”).
145
See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666; Hasen, supra note 114, at 110; see
also Philips, supra note 7, at 1156.
146
Philips, supra note 7, at 1156 (“HAVA mandates that each state receiving federal
funds for the improvement of its federal voting systems replace all ‘punch card voting
systems or lever voting systems’ prior to January 1, 2006. This means that optical scan
and DRE voting machines will be virtually universally utilized in federal elections
beginning in 2006. Included in HAVA are mandatory ‘voting systems standards’ that
states must follow for voting machines used in federal elections. . . .”).
142
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in elections using electronic voting technology.147 HAVA lacks
provisions for: (1) a verified voter paper trail; (2) source code
disclosures for adequate security testing; (3) encryption measures;
and (4) mandatory standards.148 A recently proposed amendment
calls for a verified voter paper trail but fails to require source code
disclosures or encryption measures.149
Coupling the above circumstances with the presence of only a
small number of vendors for the entire field of manufacturers
creates a problematic paradigm. An oligopolistic industry for
DREs was fueled by the infusion of monies from the federal
government under HAVA.
Existing voting rights laws were not crafted to protect the
public’s interest in security and transparency in the digital age of
computer voting. The voting legislative history focused on issues
of equality and inclusion with very little attention directed toward
security and transparency of the voting process.150 The enactment
of HAVA set off a clash between emergent digital technology and
voting rights. At this point, voting rights are losing the battle.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: COPYRIGHTS—FEDERAL
PROTECTION FOR A PROPERTY INTEREST
The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
protects patents and copyrights, as part of the intellectual property
regime in this country,151 by providing that Congress shall have the
power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”152 Unlike the
147

See sources cited supra notes 7 & 144.
See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666.
149
H.R. REP. No. 110-154, at 13 (2007).
150
See VRA, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
151
See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 308 (“Certain creations of the human mind [are]
given the legal aspects of a property right . . . [i]ntellectual property is an all
encompassing term now widely used to designate as a group all of the following fields of
law: patent, trademark, unfair competition, copyright, trade secret, moral rights, and right
of publicity.”).
152
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
148
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“right to vote,” intellectual property protections were articulated in
the Constitution from the outset as individual property rights.153
The Constitution and its iteration of “useful Arts” identify the
commercial thrust of this legislation and its utilitarian nature.154
Intellectual property rights were embedded in the Constitution with
a “limited time” to provide incentives for innovation.155
Based on this constitutional grant of authority, Congress
enacted copyright protective legislation in the Act of 1790.156
Copyrights, a federally protected right granted to fixed, original
works of authorship, confer the exclusive right to exploit the work
in specified ways for a limited period of time and have been
protected by federal statutes since the 18th century.157 Following
the Act of 1790, copyright law was expanded to include musical
compositions158 as well as additional federal jurisdiction to
determine copyright matters159 with Congress ultimately
implementing the Copyright Act of 1909.160

153
Id.; Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded
by Copyright Act of 1976 and amendments); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat.
1106 (The Chase Act) (extending copyright protection to foreign nationals and imposing
copyright registration formalities); Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124;
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 60–61 (Cambridge University Press 2003).
154
See SELL, supra note 153, at 60–61 (“The emphasis on ‘useful Arts’ underscores the
commercial intent of the legislation and the utilitarian rationale behind it. IP rights were
devised to create incentives for innovation and risk-taking.”).
155
See id. at 61.
156
See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
157
See id.; SELL, supra note 153, at 61 (“The United States passed its first Copyright
Act in 1790, which gave citizens and residents a copyright for fourteen years, renewable
for an additional fourteen if the author was still alive.”).
158
See White-Smith Music Publ. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14 (1908) (discussing
copyright infringement of musical compositions). White-Smith involved the use of
perforated music rolls and whether their use constituted an infringement of musical
compositions. Id. at 15. “Musical compositions have been the subject of copyright
protection since the statute of February 3, 1831, ch.16, 4 Stat. 436, and laws have been
passed including them since that time.” Id. at 26–27. In White-Smith, the Court held that
the rolls did not constitute copying. Id. at 31–32.
159
Act of Feb. 15, 1819, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 Stat. 481; see WILLIAM PATRY,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, VOL. 1, at 38 (1994) (noting the federal courts were not
granted original jurisdiction over copyright cases until 1819).
160
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded by
Copyright Act of 1976 and amendments).
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Originally extended to maps and charts in the 18th century,161
today copyright protection can subsist within a novel, play or even
a musical score,162 granting the author protection from
unauthorized copying, reproduction or appropriation for original
works.163
The Copyright Act of 1976,164 in a sweeping legislative
overhaul, established broad categories of copyrightable subject
matter.165
However, the question as to whether copyright
protection existed in computer software was not completely
resolved by the Copyright Act of 1976.166
Some scholars argue that a pattern of change has occurred in
copyright law which favors the interests of private stakeholders.167
They contend that the content specific language of newer copyright
161
The Copyright Act of May 31, 1790 provided protection for the author or her
assigns of maps, charts, and books for two fourteen year terms, an original and a renewal
term.
162
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Copyrightable subject matter has been divided into eight
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes and
(5) choreographic works; (6) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (7) motion picture
and (8) audiovisual works. Id. Novels are covered under id. § 102(a)(1), plays are
covered under id. § 102(a)(3) and musical scores are covered under id. § 102(a)(2). See
Long, supra note 29, at 533 n.34 (“Thus federal copyright protection in the United States
has expanded from the narrow categories of protection of charts, maps and books . . . to
include photography, motion pictures and computer software.”).
163
17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.”); see Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124;
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
164
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006)).
165
See supra note 162.
166
See I.T. Hardy, Six Copyright Theories for the Protection of Computer Object
Programs, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 845, 847 (1984) (“Source programs are unquestionably
protected by copyright; the rub comes with object programs. The first problem with
object programs is determining what they are in the terms of the 1976 Copyright Act.”);
Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
1497, 1511 (1991) (“To achieve the proper balance, CONTU recommended two principal
changes in the 1976 Copyright Act. The first change was designed to assure computer
programmers that computer programs could be copyrighted and that duplicates of a
program on disks or tape would be considered ‘copies’ for purposes of copyright
infringement.”).
167
See SELL, supra note 153, at 63.
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laws renders it inflexible and incapable of adapting to
technological change. As a result, whenever new technology
appears, the law fails to accommodate the change.168 Then the
private stakeholders push for broader legislation, narrowly tailored,
designed to give the copyright owners broader and greater
rights.169 Such laws they argue operate to the detriment of the
public, the original beneficiaries of copyright law.170
Computer software171 is designed to function in a utilitarian
manner.172 This makes it difficult to define software within an
intellectual property regime. Patent and trade secret law were

168
See Long, supra note 29, at 540 (“Given the increasingly rapid development of
technology in the Digital Age, the need for Congress to revise legislation to correct
oversights and mistakes becomes even more critical. This need should be directly
contrasted with the purported ‘need’ to provide special legislation to protect a particular
industry.”).
169
“The Copyright Act has been amended more times than its sister laws—trademarks
and patents. Of these amendments, many have been designed to protect particular
industries, such as the exemption of computer software and sound recordings from the
strictures of the First Sale Doctrine codified in [§] 109 of the Copyright Act.” Id. Long
opines that such exclusions should have been the exception and should have only
occurred to balance copyright privileges and public access when undue prejudice to the
copyright exists. See id.; see also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and
Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J.
689, 690 (2006) (The “income-generating value of intellectual property gives intellectual
property owners incentives to influence the direction of legislative change in order to
maximize intellectual property returns. Highly visible examples of changes that arguably
benefited intellectual property owners include time extensions such as the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, which protects creative works for as long as 120 years,
and the 1995 revisions to the Patent Act, which changed the calculation of patent term to
20 years from filing.”).
170
SELL, supra note 153, at 63. There is a “legislative pattern in United States
copyright law of privileging private interests of authors and owners at the expense of the
interests of the public in use and reuse of copyrighted information.” Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1996).
171
Software is a “set of computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated
documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing system, e.g. compilers,
library routines, manuals, circuit diagrams. Contrasts with hardware.” U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 326 (1984), available at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/CopyrightCompendium/fplchome.asp
[hereinafter
Compendium II]; SCOTT, supra note 46, at 741 (“Software”).
172
See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 33 (“Computer software, by its very nature as written
work intended to serve utilitarian purposes, defies easy categorization within our
intellectual property system.”).
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designed to protect new utilitarian property. Copyright law, on the
other hand, was designed to protect original literary works.173 The
stage was set for an expansion of copyright laws to include
emerging computer software technology.174
Congress established the National Commission on the New
Technological Uses of Copyright Works (“CONTU”) in 1978.175
CONTU’s mission was to study copyright law and its
interrelatedness to computer programs.176 CONTU’s Final Report
contained recommendations that were the results of hearings and
investigative studies.177 Congress requested that the Commission
study policy questions in the copyright field.178 One of the
problems assigned to the Commission was the question of the
scope of extension of copyright protection to computer
programs.179 CONTU’s recommendations were ultimately adopted
by Congress as the amendments of the 1980 Act.180
173

See id.
See SELL, supra note 153, at 63 (“Over time, the scope of subject matter eligible for
copyright protection has broadened considerably. For example . . . ‘the major computer
lobbyists in the United States pressed for computer programs to be protected by accretion
by treating them as literary works within traditional norms of copyright; and they now
have persuaded much of the world to adopt this approach.’” (quoting W.R. Cornish, The
International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55 (1993)).
175
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYYRIGHTED WORKS (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/
index.html [hereinafter CONTU Final Report].
176
See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software
“Licenses” Really Sales, and How will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q. J.
555, 564–65 n.20 (2004) (CONTU was “a congressional commission created to
‘recommend changes in the Copyright Act to accommodate advances in computer
technology.’”) (citing DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
177
See CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 1.
178
See id.
179
See id. at 1, 9–46.
180
See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, sec. 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6482 (noting that the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act were intended to implement
CONTU’s recommendations); Kramer Mfg., v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 n.8 (4th Cir.
1986) (“The [A]mendments of 1980 followed the Final Report of the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyright[ed] Works (CONTU) . . . [t]he Amendments of
1980 conformed to [CONTU’s] recommendations.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int’l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (“[T]he most valuable legislative
history materials concerning the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Amendment of 1980 are
the reports of CONTU.”).
174
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Unsurprisingly, software was included as a copyrightable subject
matter in CONTU’s recommendations.181
The 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act, extended copyright
subject matter protection to application programs and operating
system programs in both object code and source code versions.182
This amendment opened the door to the current legal conflict
which occurs when DREs are used with copyright protected
software inaccessible to the public during federal elections.183 The
inaccessibility of the software for independent review and auditing
purposes means that the public cannot ascertain whether hacking,
fraud or corruption of the voting process has occurred.184 Private
vendors, owners of protected intellectual property, now exert
access control in an area where voting—a public good—exists.
The stage is set for a clash.
A. Source Code and Object Code and Copyright Protection
In order to operate, DREs use computer operating systems.
These systems employ computer programs containing object and
source codes. The object185 and/or source code186 is usually the
181

See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 35 (“Congress implemented CONTU’s
recommendations in 1980 by adding a definition of ‘computer program’ to [§] 101 of the
Copyright Act and amending [§] 117 of the Act to authorize the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make another copy or adaptation of the program for the purpose of
running the program on a computer.”).
182
Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. “‘A copyright
program, whether in object code or source code, is a ‘literary work’ and is protected from
unauthorized copying, whether from its object source or source code version.’”
MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 405 (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)).
183
Massey, supra note 28, at 234 (“The source of this problem is the proprietary source
code that drives these paperless electronic voting machines. Unlike paper based voting
machines, DREs operate entirely by computer, meaning that at no state of the election
process can the public see the physical counting of the votes. Absent access to the source
code that the runs the DRE, the public has no way of knowing how—or if—the machine
records and tabulates votes.”).
184
Id. at 235.
185
MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at 409 (“Object code is [t]he lowest level of computer
language. Object code is ‘machine readable’ by a computer and cannot be read by
humans. Object code is often expressed in binary language, using ‘on-off’ or ‘0-1’
notation such as ‘01101001’. Computer programs written in source code are readable by
human and are written in computer languages such as BASIC or FORTRAN. However,
computers cannot understand source code, so to use the program, it must be translated
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property of the vendor owners of the machine and is subject to
copyright protection. The purchaser of the machine, typically a
governmental entity generally, has limited access to this
copyrighted protected material without permission.
The term source code refers to a computer program written in
programming language that uses complex symbolic names, along
with complex rules of syntax.187 Some of the languages are
BASIC, COBOL or FORTRAN.188 The purpose of the source
code is to provide instructions to the computer to perform a
particular task.189 CONTU also weighed in on the definitions of
object code and source code in its final report to Congress.190
Object Code is most succinctly defined as:
[A] translation of the source code language into the
machine language of the computer (e.g. binary
coding using zeros and ones or hexadecimal coding
using letters and numbers or octal coding using zero
to seven) that the computer executes.
Only
instructions expressed in object code can be used
‘directly’ by the computer.191
A government or public entity who has purchased a DRE that
relies on object and source code, absent cooperation, cannot
validate that the code is operating as it should, is not subject to
unusual errors or irregularities or contains vulnerabilities which
subject the entire process to hacking, subversion or manipulation.
The governmental entity has to rely upon the owner or vendor of
the machine for assurance that the voting machine will operate, or
has operated (after an election), as it should for the purposes of a
into machine-readable object code. Computer programs written in both source code and
object code are copyrightable and can qualify as trade secrets.”); see Whelan Assocs. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In every program, it is the
object code, not the source code, that directs the computer to perform functions. The
object code is therefore the final instruction to the computer.”).
186
See supra note 46 for a definition of source code.
187
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44 (1990).
188
Compendium II, supra note 171, § 321.01.
189
See generally RUBIN, supra note 7, at 3; Massey, supra note 28, at 238.
190
CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 21 n.109.
191
SCOTT, supra note 46, at 553; see also CONTU Final Report, supra note 175, at 21
n.109.
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fairly conducted election if the vendor owner disallows access to
the software for testing. The voter as the end user of the computer
voting machine has even less access to the computer program. The
DRE vendor with copyright and trade secret protections for its
software does not provide an independent right of review or audit
of its property. Thus the voter cannot affirm that his or her right to
participate in a fairly conducted election has not been
circumvented by faulty or even ineffective computer programs for
voting, or recounting purposes.192
In addition, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”),193 passed by Congress in 1998, poses problems for
voting rights. Originally created as an uneasy solution to the
problems of copying on the Internet,194 the DMCA was designed to
eliminate the contributory liability of Internet service providers for
the transmission of allegedly infringing works.195 The DMCA
provided safe harbors for Internet service providers who were then
obligated to protect the rights of copyright owners after receiving
notice of infringement from the copyright holder.196 The Internet
provider had to “take down” the infringing material or suffer the
loss of the safe harbor provisions.197
In addition to the notice and take-down provisions, the DMCA
contains subpoena power for the copyright holder.198 This power
allows the copyright holder to procure a subpoena from a federal
district clerk to obtain disclosure from the service provider of the
identity of a purported infringer.199 This disclosure provision
designed “to protect music from digital pirates” provides a chilling
192
See Massey, supra note 28, at 242–43 (noting that auditing, without access to the
proprietary source code, “becomes a pointless endeavor because all an auditor has to
work with is potentially flawed election data produced by a black box in which it is
impossible to see how it created that data”).
193
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
194
See Long, supra note 29, at 533–36.
195
See id. at 536–37.
196
See id. at 537; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E) (2006).
197
See id. at 537–38.
198
Id. at 538 n.25 (“‘Upon receipt of the issued subpoena . . . the service provider shall
expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright
owner the information required by the subpoena. . . .’” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5))).
199
Id. at 538.
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mechanism for software owners to suppress any dissemination of
materials concerning proprietary information on voting
machines.200
The software developer for voting machines and/or owner
typically use both copyright201 and trade secrecy protection for
their works as proprietary intellectual property, because trade
secrecy provides advantages to the vendors in addition to those
available under copyright or patent.202 Again the intellectual
property protections available to the DRE vendor and its software
appear to outweigh the voting rights concern of the public.
V. TRADE SECRETS—STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION
The intellectual property protection which provides more
extensive coverage for the software contained in DREs is the
commercial tool of trade secrets.203 State laws generally provide
protection for intellectual property as technological information
through trade secrets.204 While copyright protection for a product
emanates from federal law, trade secret protections generally are

200

Id. at 543 (suggesting that DRE vendor Diebold’s use of procedures designed to
prohibit digital piracy to prohibit the dissemination of information regarding e-voting
security highlights the problematic nature of DMCA procedures and the imminent threat
to “the free circulation of speech and information”).
201
See supra notes 162–84. Copyright duration is extensive: for works created after
1977, the term is 70 years plus the author’s lifetime; for works made for hire, the term is
95 years from first publication or 120 years from the year of creation whichever expires
first. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
202
See Levine, supra note 7, at 135 (“Trade secrecy—the intellectual property doctrine
that allows businesses to keep commercially valuable information secret for a potentially
unlimited amount of time—is increasingly intruding in the operation of our public
infrastructure, including voting machines, the Internet, and telecommunications.”).
203
See id. at 136–37 (“Trade secrecy, by its very name, invokes two core interests:
secrecy and commerce. It is a singularly commercial doctrine designed to protect
commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals to keep secret, for a
potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes and inventions that afford them
pecuniary gain.”).
204
See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 4 (“Today, every one of the 50 states protects trade
secrets in one form or another.”).
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derived from state law.205 Initially states relied on the Restatement
(First) of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used
in one’s business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for
a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for
machine or other device, or a list of customers.206
Trade secret laws, although adopted in a piecemeal fashion
from state to state, provide astute vendors with a strong defensive
enforcement tool for keeping their proprietary software out of
reach of inquiring minds or auditing hands while copyright
protection is limited to tangible expressions.207
205

See Levine, supra note 7, at 155–56 (“By 2005, a form of the UTSA [Uniform Trade
Secret Act] had been adopted in forty-four states and the District of Columbia.”); see also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (citing state authority for
trade secret protection).
206
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (1939); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167,
171 (2005) (arguing that the unsuccessful marriage of copyright and technology has
created a new legislative regulation of technological behavior, which may be dubbed
“technological” regulation).
For example, the legal entitlements of trade secret law reinforce
software’s technological ability to keep its creative expression from
reaching the public. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act [for
example] puts its considerable legal weight behind the technological
access restrictions and copy protection that copyright owners use to
control their digital goods . . . . For source code, the more important
protection is found in trade secret law, a regulatory regime predicated
on maintaining the secrecy of valuable commercial information, such
as formulas or manufacturing processes . . . . Therefore, as long as a
software developer takes reasonable steps to keep source code secret
from the prying eyes of competitors and the public, trade secret law
provides legal remedies for its unauthorized and improper
appropriation.
Id. at 171–72, 177 (paragraphing omitted).
207
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) provides that copyright protection does not extend to any
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such
work.” Note, however, that the subject matter of trade secret law is not limited to
tangible expression, but allows for protection of an idea that has not been reduced to
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Gradually states have adopted The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“UTSA”) that is now implemented in forty-three different
states.208 The UTSA provides a starting point for understanding
trade secret law applicable to the technology inherent in DRE
voting machines. UTSA defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(i)derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.209
This broad statutory definition provides the owner of software
a viable mechanism for preventing copying, reproduction or access
to the inner workings of the intellectual product under the mantle
of maintaining trade secret protection.210
The Seventh Circuit provided a telling description of the
amorphous nature of a trade secret.211 The concept of trade secrets
is a chimerical, unanalyzed concept, which arises as a secondary
tangible form as long as there is sufficient concreteness. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985) (defining a “trade secret” as “information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, device, method, technique, or process”). Thus the astute business
person can fashion IP protection for technological concrete “ideas” as well as
copyrightable tangible products using a combination of both trade secrets and copyright
protection.
208
See 1-5 LESTER HORWITZ & ETHAN HORWITZ, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING
AND LITIGATION § 5.01(1) (MB 2008) (“Although the most frequent source of trade secret
law was traditionally state common law, since 1980 some 43 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” ).
209
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
210
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The Minnesota Supreme Court
in Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc. 278 N.W. 2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979) recited
a “workable test” for trade secret in an employee-employer dispute that can be applied
generally: “(1) the protected matter is not generally known or readily ascertainable, (2) it
provides a demonstrable competitive advantage, (3) it was gained at expense to the
employer, and (4) it is such that the employer intended to keep it confidential.” Id. at 90.
211
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
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consequence of the primary precept that the law expects everyone
to adhere to the rudimentary requirements of good faith.212 Almost
any type of knowledge or information used in the conduct of
business is amenable to being characterized as a trade secret.213
Even prior to the adoption of copyright protection laws for
computer software, owners tried to prevent users from copying
their software by claiming trade secrecy protection for the
programs.214 Although not without weaknesses, trade secret
protection provides an appropriate defense for software owners and
the owners of electronic voting machines to use in protecting their
intellectual property. Its chimerical nature allows businesses to
place many of their intellectual property assets under the protective
arm of a trade secret defense as long as the requirements are
met.215
The weaknesses of trade secret protection occur because of its
very nature.216 A trade secret can exist only if its proprietor takes
steps to maintain its secrecy and it is substantially a secret within
the industry.217
Also independent invention and reverse
engineering can be used to circumvent trade secret protection.218
212

E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
Smith, 203 F.2d at 373.
214
See LEMLEY, supra note 45, at 4 (“Against this backdrop, it was important for
software vendors in the 1970s and early 1980s to establish the rights vis-a-vis users. One
way for vendors to prevent users from freely copying their computer programs was to
claim a program as a trade secret.”).
215
See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 208, § 5.01(1) (“In making a determination
whether information is susceptible to protection as a trade secret, counsel should
determine whether it qualifies on each of five points. . . . (1) Appropriate subject matter;
(2) Maintained as secret; (3) Not generally known in the industry; (4) Commercialized or
of potential value; and (5) Concrete.”).
216
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490–91 (1974); see Levine, supra
note 7, at 146–47 n.42 (“Indeed, one of the major differences between trade secrecy law
and the other three major areas of intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, and
patents) is that those three areas have significant statutory support and history . . . . Thus
in order to explore the underpinnings of trade secrecy, it is especially important to review
early case law and those opinions that became the classic statements of trade secrecy’s
definition, application, and purview.”); see also 15 U.S.C. (codifying trademark law); 17
U.S.C. (2006) (codifying copyright law); 35 U.S.C. (2006) (codifying patent law).
217
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490–91. In order to protect a trade secret the owner
must work to render the product as immune as possible to reverse engineering or risk a
diminution of exclusivity. Id. at 476.
218
Id. at 476.
213
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In order to maintain trade secret protection, the owners of trade
secrets are required to establish stringent secrecy protocols for
anyone licensing or using their equipment.219
Trade secret protections can be used to prevent election
officials from releasing DRE software to independent auditors for
a review and testing of the electronic software within DREs.220
This is particularly important as a second stage check for a security
audit.
Simultaneously the term of protection for trade secrets is of an
unlimited duration.221 The protection afforded by trade secret law
is both greater and less than that given under patent law.222 Trade
secret protection is greater than patent law because it is not limited
to a fixed number of years and does not require novelty and
invention as in the case of patents. It affords less protection than
patent law because other persons can develop the technology
independently and use it as long as no unfair or fraudulent means
were used.223 It does not require the originality of copyright nor
fixation. In fact, its strength may lie in the owners’ ability to
maintain it as knowledge and pure information.
As one scholar phrased it:
[t]he source of this problem [trade secret protection
for electronic computer software] is the proprietary
source code that drives these paperless electronic
voting machines.
Unlike paper-based voting
machines, DREs operate entirely by computer,
meaning that at no stage of the election process can
the public see the physical counting of the votes.
Absent access to the source code that runs the DRE,
219

Id. at 486–87.
Long, supra note 29, at 551 (“[T]he encryption and security testing exceptions must
be expanded to allow for legitimate testing, including by amateurs, of encryption and
security devices.”).
221
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring).
222
Id. at 489–90. Patents are “[a] grant by the federal government to an inventor of the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.” MCCARTHY, supra
note 44, at 433. The subject of a patent must be novel, nonobviousness and useful. Id. at
435; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2006) (describing what inventions are patentable and
conditions for patentability).
223
See supra note 218.
220
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the public has no way of knowing how—or if—the
machine records and tabulates votes.224
Computer software programs have been afforded intellectual
property protection as copyrighted proprietary products and as
trade secrets.225 The intellectual property laws are ostensibly
designed to protect the owner’s business advantage while
encouraging creativity and innovation.226 Copyright infringement
laws provide swift remedial justice to anyone copying or
unlawfully acquiring the use of said intellectual property in
software.227 Trade secret protection provides unlimited duration
for the intellectual property rights of the owner.228
The prevailing economic theory on patents and copyrights is
that intellectual property protection allows the owner the use and
enjoyment of her property for a limited time. At the end of that
time, so the theory goes, the information, technology, and
knowledge enters the public domain for the use and enjoyment of
224

Massey, supra note 28, at 234.
In practice, proprietary code-based DREs have proven to be errorridden and prone to security weaknesses because the closed nature of
the code has forced state agencies to protect manufacturers’
intellectual property at the expense of a reliable voting system. The
proprietary nature of the code requires a closed state review process
that has not eliminated serious errors and security flaws because it
limits the number of people testing the software. That closed process
also contradicts public policy and American tradition favoring
openness through transparent and accountable government.
Id. at 235.
225
See supra notes 182–84, 214–15; see also David Bender, The Future of Software
Protection: Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, 47
U. PITT. L. REV. 907, 939 (1986).
226
SELL, supra note 153, at 60–61 (“The United States included intellectual property in
the Constitution . . . . The emphasis on ‘useful Arts’ underscores the commercial intent
of the legislation and the utilitarian rationale behind it. IP rights were devised to create
incentives for innovation and risk-taking. This is consistent with both Benthamite and
Lockean notions of property: ‘with property rights people have an incentive to labour and
industry will prosper.’”); see Levine, supra note 7, at 137 (“Trade secrecy, by its very
name, invokes two core interests: secrecy and commerce. It is a singularly commercial
doctrine designed to protect commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals
to keep secret, for a potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes, and inventions
that afford them pecuniary gain.”).
227
Bender, supra note 225, at 912; see Thomas, supra note 225, at 709–11.
228
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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the public.229 The monopoly is created to incentivize innovation
ends. The author has been rewarded and the discovery, knowledge
and information become part of the public commons.230
The protections found in trade secrets do not have a parallel
theory of replenishing the commons. It is designed entirely for the
benefit of the commercial user.231
Some scholars have argued that copyright’s reach has also
established a commodification of creativity. They argue that the
tools of this commodification process have included the
alienability of the copyright interest, the long duration of
copyright, the strong distribution rights and the demise of
significant user rights.232 This argument posits that the copyright
owners’ power has expanded vis-à-vis those wishing to use
copyright material because of a contraction of user rights, to
include fair dealing/fair use rights and public interests rights.233
Yet copyright protection does have a limited duration. It was also
designed with the competing interests of the public and the
property interest of the copyright owner in mind.
In trade secret law, the private stakeholders’ interest and the
public’s clash in the intersection of public rights and commerce.
Trade secret law in areas where “private businesses are utilizing
commercial law standards and norms, including the key tool of
229

See Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L. J. 1, 33 (2004). “Allowing such imitation obviously would deter future
innovators and result in a suboptimal level of innovation. To prevent this result, the
patent and copyright laws grant inventors a right to exclude.” Id.
230
Id. at 32.
231
Id. at 32–33; see Levine, supra note 7, at 136 (“Trade secrecy, by its very name,
invokes two core interests: secrecy and commerce. It is a singularly commercial doctrine
designed to protect commercial interests by allowing companies and individuals to keep
secret, for a potentially unlimited time, those formulas, processes, and inventions that
afford them pecuniary gain.”).
232
BIRGITTE ANDERSEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE,
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 46 (2006).
233
Id. at 48.
This has been accompanied by significant shifts in rhetoric. Not only
have the monopoly privileges of intellectual property owners become
‘rights’, user rights have become ‘defenses’ or ‘exceptions’. The
public domain is thus protected by ‘exceptions’ to rights. Nothing
could better encapsulate its current vulnerability.
Id.
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trade secrecy,” conflicts with the “methods and purpose of
transparent and accountable democratic governance.”234 Where
voting machines are involved the public is expecting a device
which furthers governmental and democratic interests235 not a
commercially competitive product.
Recently, the owners of one of the top DRE vendors have
admitted that the machines include software flaws.236 However,
without the accessibility of the software for independent audit
purposes, the public cannot be assured of security and
accountability in the vote process.
With the admixture of copyright and trade secret protection in
the voting machines, the DRE software has a potentially unlimited
lifetime of protection coupled with strong tools for its enforcement
against interference. As a result of this combined protection, the
software owner in voting machines can maintain unlimited
intellectual property protection duration and the public does not
have independent access to the public good. Critically the public is
denied access to a fundamental public utility, the election system,
during the voting process.237
234

Levine, supra note 7, at 137–38 (“Secrecy, and its attendant goals of pecuniary gain
and commercial competition, conflict with the methods and purpose of transparent and
accountable democratic governance. This conflict is crystallized in the private
distribution of voting machines.”).
235
Id. at 138 (“These machines, replacing older (but not necessarily less reliable) pulllever and punch-card systems, are the public infrastructure through which elections are
conducted, votes are counted, and the results are verified. They form the backbone upon
which one can exercise the right to vote; they instill confidence that one’s vote will not be
disregarded, lost, or erroneously tabulated.”).
236
Ellen Gedalius, Company Accepts Blame for Vote Woes, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 28,
2008, at 1. In the Hillsborough County, Florida primary election in August, Premier
Election Solutions accepted responsibility for a glitch in the system that caused a delay in
posting the election results. Id. “The problem occurred because the identification
numbers for the different databases—for absentee, early, and precinct votes—did not
match, so the numbers could not be merged into one report.” Id. Premier stated that the
$6 million system will work properly in the general election in November. Id.; see also
Duane Marsteller, Elections Officials Back Machines Despite Reported Glitch,
BRADENTON HERALD, Aug. 23, 2008, at 1. Premier Election Solutions notified counties
across the U.S. that their machines have a glitch that causes the actual counting machine
to prematurely display a completion screen before all of the votes are uploaded into the
system to be tallied. Id.
237
See Levine, supra note 7, at 140 (asserting that the access to information so
necessary for a transparent and accountable democratic government suffers as private
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A. Oligopoly in the DRE Marketplace
1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Voting Rights
In this section, this Article proposes to use game theory tools to
describe how the DRE oligopoly acts to upset the balance between
voting rights and intellectual property rights.238 Both intellectual
property rights and voting rights are constitutionally protected
interests.239 Normally, in the face of a conflict between two
protected rights, the competing fundamental interests would be
identified and the countervailing interests weighed. In the midst of
competing claims, the law would weigh in and survey the
contextual background, attempt to impose a balancing of the
interests analysis and ultimately prioritize the rights.
Unfortunately, in an oligopoly the vendors by collectively
controlling the price, the output, and supply240 ultimately upset the
balance between the two rights by asserting primacy for the
property right over the individual liberty of voting. They do this
industry both increasingly relies on secrecy to maintain its competitive edge and private
industry increasingly expands into the provision of public infrastructure and democratic
functions such as voting). “[T]rade secrecy law and practices serve many useful and
important purposes in private industry, but . . . their use in the public infrastructure is
inappropriate, unexpectedly powerful, and doctrinally unsound.” Id.
238
See Piraino, supra note 25, at 18–19. The small concentrated market of an oligopoly
makes it easier for the firms to collectively set their output and pricing. See id.
Recent models of game theory explain why oligopolists are able to
maintain a price equilibrium at a level above that which would
prevail in a perfectly competitive market (i.e., above marginal cost) . .
..
....
. . . Each firm recognizes its interdependence with other firms in the
market and understands that “its optimal price is a function of the
price charged by its rivals.” An oligopolist is aware that its rivals are
as strongly armed as it is with weapons of price reductions,
aggressive advertising, and product improvement. Thus each firm
will want to avoid prompting aggressive competitive responses from
its rivals. If one firm cuts prices in an effort to boost sales, rivals
may be compelled to match the price cut, not only rendering the
initial effort to secure additional volume unsuccessful, but making all
firms worse off than before.
Id.
239
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
240
See supra notes 5, 24–25 and accompanying text.
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by collectively refusing to allow access to their software for
independent auditing and testing and by refusing to upgrade their
technology to address security, accuracy and transparency
problems. Their conduct as an oligopoly eliminates non-price
competition in areas of quality, service and access.
In examining a game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma,241 we
observe how two firms collectively can operate to maintain control
and preclude access.242
Two hypothetical salesmen, Joshua and Jake, were arrested for
hacking into a computer system and downloading customers’
personal information with the intent to commit identity theft. At
the police station, the authorities separated and interrogated them.
The police offered the following deal to each one separately:
confess or remain silent. If Joshua confessed (implicated Jake) and
Jake remained silent, Joshua would receive one year in prison—a
short sentence for cooperating with the police and helping to prove
charges against Jake. In this scenario, Jake would receive ten
years.
If, however, Jake confessed implicating Joshua who remained
silent, Jake would receive one year in prison and Joshua would
receive ten years. If they both confessed, they would each receive
five years for saving authorities from having to prove the charges
in trial. If neither confessed, the authorities might be able to
sentence them each with six months for unlawful use of computer
property, but the authorities would not be able to charge either with
identity theft. The best strategy for either Joshua or Jake is to
confess, without cooperating with the other.243
Confessing is the best strategy for Joshua whether or not he
knows if Jake is going to confess. It is also the best strategy for
Joshua whether or not he knows if Jake is going to remain silent.
241

See supra note 11 for a discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 4 (Princeton University
Press 1992) (1958) (describing the classic tool of game theory called a normal-form
representation, where each player simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination
of strategies chosen by the players determines a payoff for each player); RASMUSEN supra
note 11, at 21; see also supra note 11 (quoting Rasmusen’s description of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma).
243
See supra note 11; see generally RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 19–22.
242
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Joshua does not need to know anything about Jake’s strategy to
know that the best strategy for him is going to be confession. The
same holds true for Jake. Why? Because if Joshua confesses, he
will be better off, no matter what Jake does, and the reverse is true
for Jake. The game matrix below represents the choices for the
two prisoners. Joshua’s choices are represented by the first
number. Jake’s choices are represented by the second number.

Joshua:
Deny
(protect
Jake)
Joshua:
Confess
(blame
Jake)

Jake:
Deny
(protect
Joshua)
6 mos,
6 mos

Jake:
Confess
(blame
Joshua)
10 yrs, 1 yr

1 yrs, 10yrs

5 yrs, 5yrs

Note, the only circumstance which would improve Joshua’s
and Jake’s situation is a binding agreement to co-operate (deny)
beforehand.
If the two men were not able to make a binding cooperation
pact to remain silent before being arrested, they are engaged at the
police station in what is known as a non-cooperative game.244 This
type of game (a zero-sum, non-cooperative game)245 and game
244

“A cooperative game is a game in which the players can make binding
commitments, as opposed to a non-cooperative game, in which they cannot.” RASMUSEN,
supra note 11, at 21.
245
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 38 (noting that in game theory, specifically in finite two
person zero sum games, the minimax theorem operates). “The minimax theorem states
that one can assign to every finite, two person, zero-sum game a value V: the average
amount that player I can expect to win from player II if both players act sensibly.” Id.
This theorem allows the analyst to simplify the study of games by predicting a sensible
course of action. “[T]he outcome is intimately related to both players’ behavior and each
is at the mercy of the other’s caprice.” Id. at 39. The term ‘zero-sum’ (or equivalently,
‘constant sum’) means the players have diametrically opposed interests. The term comes
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theory can help us analyze the activities and predict the conduct in
an oligopolistic marketplace similar to the electronic voting
machine market.
In an oligopoly, each firm faces a situation much like a game.
Each firm must choose a strategy, taking into account the other
organization’s strategies and reactions to its decisions.246 In the
current voting machine marketplace, there are two principal
suppliers: Premier and ES&S (and a third smaller supplier,
Sequoia), that supply the majority of the machines to the fifty
states.247 Complaints concerning the lack of accuracy248 of
electronic voting machines attributable to deficiencies within the
proprietary software or failure of the vendor to provide properly
functioning machines are publicly reported.249 Yet the vendors,
from parlor games like poker where there is a fixed amount of money around the table. If
you want to win some money, others have to lose an equivalent amount. Two nations
trading make up a non-zero-sum game since both may simultaneously gain. Id. at 14.
246
Sagi, supra note 14, at 277.
247
See supra note 1.
248
See supra note 38.
249
See Nikita Stewart, District's Primary Results Certified, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2008, at B01 (reporting a glitch in the primary election held in Washington, D.C. in
September, 2008 that could have possibly been an error with the Sequoia Voting Systems
equipment); sources cited supra note 236. With regards to the primary issues in
Washington, D.C., the Election Officials and Sequoia Election Systems are not quite sure
what happened. Nikita Stewart, Lawyers Will Monitor Polls Nov. 4, WASH. POST, Sept.
30, 2008, at B02. The District of Columbia maintains that the problem was a faulty
memory cartridge. Id. Sequoia, however, vehemently denies this and attributes the glitch
to human error. Id. After controversy in the 2006 election in Sarasota County Florida, the
county commissioners unanimously voted to end their relationship with ES&S, and
instead have chosen to use Diebold voting machines. Patrick Whittle, Sarasota Switches
Voting Machine; County Dumps its Old Company and Cuts a Deal With a New Maker,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, June 7, 2007, at BS1. As of August, 2008, touch-screen
machines set up in half of Ohio’s counties didn’t work properly, and the Secretary of
State, Jennifer Brunner, wanted Diebold to pay for it. Mark Niquette, Missing Votes
Spark Lawsuit; Brunner: Touch-screen Machines Defective, Company Should Pay,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2008, at 01A. Brunner planned to file a lawsuit to get the
money back from the equipment and to seek punitive damages after an investigation
showed that votes in at least 11 counties were “‘dropped’ in elections when memory
cards were uploaded.” Id. Premier filed a lawsuit against the state saying that it had
satisfied its obligations under the contract. Id. Florida, however, is choosing a different
type of voting machine from ES&S (one that actually calls for the voter to make a paper
vote, and not solely electronic) instead of the one used at the election in 2006, but it is not
specifically stating that the reason is due to previous machine malfunction. Kathy Gill,
States Abandoning Touchscreen Voting Equipment, ABOUT.COM, Aug. 18, 2008,
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claiming trade secret and copyright protection, refuse to release the
software for independent testing prior to an election, or
independent auditing after an election, or change or alter their
software allowing open source software.250 As a Princeton
University computer scientist who conducted testing on Diebold
(Premier) AccuVote-TS voting machines for code attacks wrote,
“Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting
machines’ hardware and software and the adoption of more
rigorous election procedures.”251 Strangely, in the face of
mounting criticism,252 the DRE vendors have not been driven to
http://www.uspolitics.about.com/b/2008/08/18/states-abandoning-touchscreen-votingequipment.htm. Furthermore:
One way in which fraud could occur is through the use of
‘homebrew’ smartcards. When voters show up at telling site, they
are given smart cards that they insert into the DRE and that allows
them to receive a ballot. Computer scientists found that attackers
could create their own homebrew smartcards . . . .
. . . This danger was highlighted by the Compuware Report, a 246
page report commissioned by the state of Ohio, that examined the
DREs of the four major vendors: Diebold, ES&S, Hart and Sequoia.
The report found that the four-digit PIN code for the smart card “is a
factory default from Diebold [that] cannot be changed . . . [and] was
guessed in less than two minutes of testing.” Voters who are able to
program their own smartcards have the ability to vote multiple times
on a machine by ignoring the voting terminal’s deactivation
command.
Carrier, supra note 3, at 657–58.
250
As recently as October 4, 2008, a DRE vendor, Sequoia has appeared in court in
litigation concerning the accuracy of its machines and opposed the release of an
independent test conducted on its machines by Princeton computer scientist, Dr. Appel
regarding the accuracy, and security of its machines. See Diane C. Walsh, Jersey
Disputes Report Faulting Voting Machines, STAR LEDGER NEWS (Newark), Oct. 18,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-14/
122430339766090.xml&coll=1. Dr Appel’s report found that Sequoia’s machines could
“be easily hacked, while a professor from Carnegie Mellon University scoffed at the
findings, according to two divergent reports released yesterday by the Superior Court
Judge presiding over the case challenging the machines’ reliability.” Id.
251
See ARIE J. FELDMAN, J. ALEX HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, Security
Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine 1 (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/ts06full.pdf.
252
Id. at 1 (“Analysis of the machine . . . shows that it is vulnerable to extremely
serious attacks. For example, an attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its
removable memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious code;
malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs,
and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker could
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change and upgrade like most sellers in a competitive market by
the market demand for upgrade in quality improvement. Even
stranger, they have not been challenged by the entry of many new
upstart firms eager to gain a foothold in a lucrative voting machine
market fueled by government cash.
The odd situation is
reminiscent of novelist Lewis Carroll’s phrase, “Curiouser and
Curiouser,” in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.253
By viewing an analogous situation in a game, we should be
able to translate the insights gained into a quantitative model.
Subsequently, a review of that quantitative model allows us to
make inferences concerning the behavior of the players.254
Historically, economists reviewed an oligopoly in terms of
game theory.255 Game theory, an analytical tool utilized to
comprehend interactions between persons when each person’s
actions affect the others,256 should help us predict the actions of the
players in the oligopolistic DRE market. Game theory helps to
explain how oligopolists maintain their actions and conduct around
pricing. With so few firms in the relevant market, the firms are
able to make pricing decisions with reference to the reaction of

also create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently from machine to
machine during normal election activities—a voting-machine virus.”).
253
Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, was actually Charles
Lutwidge Dodson, a mathematics teacher at Christ Church, Oxford. See Martin Gardner,
The Annotated Alice xxiii (2000) (“He [Lewis Carroll] had a great fondness for playing
with mathematics, logics and words, for writing nonsense and for the company of
attractive little girls.”). Gardner identifies a quote in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,
as an allusion to game theory, where Alice and the Duchess, a strange character, engage
in a long conversation: “‘Of course it is’, said the Duchess, who seemed ready to agree to
everything that Alice said: ‘There’s a large mustard-mine near here. And the moral of
that is—‘the more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.’” Id. at 92. “Carroll seems
to have invented this proverb. It describes what in modern game theory is called a two
person zero sum game—a game in which the payoff to the winner exactly equals the
losses of the loser.” Id. at 92 n.7. In a zero sum game what one player gains, another
player must lose.
254
DAVIS, supra note 12, at xv; Piraino, supra note 25, at 18 (“Game theory explains
how oligopolists can maintain supracompetitive prices without entering into express
price-fixing agreements. In an oligopoly, where there are so few firms in the relevant
market, it is easier for firms to make pricing decisions in ‘reference to the likely reaction
of competitors.’” (citations omitted)).
255
Werden, supra note 13, at 720.
256
WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOMICS 432 (Barron’s Educ. Series 2006) (1987).
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their rivals.257 As asserted by one legal scholar, the oligiopolists
recognize their interdependence and the fact that “its optimal price
is a function of the price charged by its rivals.”258 More
importantly each firm is “aware that its competitors are armed as it
is with weapons of price reductions, aggressive advertising and
product improvement.”259
First, a game is started by naming the rules. The elements of
the game are: players, actions, payoffs and information.260 The
objective of the game theorist is to describe a situation in terms of
the rules of the games in order to explain what will happen in that
situation.261 The rules also have to specify the steps or actions the
players can take in a situation. For our purposes, the actions could
include: allowing or restricting access; lowering or raising prices;
offering or refusing to offer better quality; and/or better service.
The rules would include the pertinent information each player
possesses concerning the market, i.e. the demand for the products.
The rules would also have to provide for the amount of
information each player possesses concerning the other players.
Finally, the rules would have to allow for information to include
the profits each player receives from the steps taken by all players
and the optimal profit which determines the outcome of the
game.262
Two types of games are relevant to our study of oligopolies:
one shot games263 and repeated games.264 One shot games are
257

Piraino, supra note 25, at 19.
Id.
259
Id.
260
GIBBONS, supra note 242, at 3 (“The normal-form representation of a game
specifies: (1) the players in the game, (2) the strategies available to each player, and (3)
the payoff received by each player for each combination of strategies that could be
chosen by the players.”).
261
RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 12.
262
Werden, supra note 13, at 721.
263
Werden opines that one shot games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
[A]re a mainstay of modern economic thinking about competition
even though they are criticized for abstracting from the real-world
fact that competitors meet again and again. Economists nevertheless
believe one-shot game oligopoly models provide useful, if imperfect
predictions of the behavior of real world oligopolies, and these
models have been found to explain . . . reasonably well the levels of
prices and profits typically observed in real-world industries.
258
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those which are played only once whereas repeated games are
those where the same game is played many times.265 A game
theorist observed:
In game settings, such as the prisoners’ dilemma
game, each player’s goal is to find her payoff
maximizing strategy, taking into account the rival’s
strategy. Such strategies constitute a stable solution
if neither player has an incentive to change her
strategy, given the rival’s strategy. The stable
solution is called ‘Nash equilibrium’ after John
Nash who developed the concept.266
Returning to the game theory application of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in looking at how oligopolies work, we can see that
normally the DRE vendors would always have an incentive to
provide access. Access to the software ultimately creates an
opportunity for a larger market share and increased profits.
For example, suppose you have two players—Vendor 1 and
Vendor 2—and each produces the same type of voting machines,
Id. at 759. In a single shot game each individual oligopolist wants to maximize its profit
at the end of the period and is not concerned about future actions. Id.
264
Id. at 765 (“Repeated game oligopoly models are not understood to make contrary
predictions. These models show that pricing coordination is possible under certain
circumstances, but very few economists take the models so literally that they believe
coordinated pricing occurs without communication of any form. A widely held view is
that repeated game models correctly identify what outcomes are possible in oligopoly,
but which outcomes actually are achieved is determined by forces outside the models,
including agreements among competitors.”).
265
Willard K. Tom, Application of Game Theory to Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV.
457, 459 (citing JOHN NASH, Non-cooperative Games, 54 Annals of Mathematics 286
(1951)).
266
Sagi, supra note 14, at 277 n.11 (describing the Nash equilibrium). A Nash
equilibrium occurs when all the players are simultaneously choosing the best strategy as a
reply to the strategy of all other players. See RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 26 (“Nash
equilibrium [is reached ] if no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy given that
the other players do not deviate.”); Werden, supra note 13, at 765 (“Repeated game
oligopoly models are not understood to make contrary predictions. These models show
that pricing coordination is possible under certain circumstances, but very few
economists take the models so literally that they believe coordinated pricing occurs
without communication of any form. A widely held view is that repeated game models
correctly identify what outcomes are possible in oligopoly, but which outcomes actually
are achieved is determined by forces outside the models, including agreements among
competitors.”).
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yet neither DRE vendor provides access to their software. Access
to the software impacts their profitability. Restricting access keeps
prices high and earns increased profits. If Vendor 1 releases access
to his software, Vendor 1 will gain business since buyers will
choose the machine that provides more access, transparency and
potential accuracy. Vendor 2, on the other hand, by refusing
access will lose business. If Vendor 2 releases access to the
software, and Vendor 1 does not, Vendor 1 will lose business. If
both release access to their software and fares drop (either because
other entities reverse engineer or allow buyers to duplicate the
product) they will both be worse off, if the sales do not increase
significantly.
Like the two prisoners, Joshua and Jake, the best individual
strategy for Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 is to provide access to their
software. If they are involved in a non-cooperative scenario, the
best strategy for each firm individually is to provide a machine
with access to the software. No matter what the other vendor does,
the individual optimal strategy, or Nash equilibrium for each is to
provide access.267 The following matrix268 represents the pay-offs
in the two vendor (V1, V2) situation where the decisions involve
providing access to software or denying access.

Vendor 2
Provides
Access
Vendor 2
Denies Access

Vendor 1
Provides
Access
Vendor 1 gets: $100
Vendor 2 gets: $100

Vendor 1
Denies
Access
-$20
$120

Vendor 1 gets: $120
Vendor 2 gets: -$20

$30
$30

Should one move before the other, that firm would likely gain a
larger market share. That advantage, however, might be shortlived if the second vendor moved to allow access and a price war
267

See WESSELS, supra note 256, at 433.
This matrix is based on a payoff matrix describing strategies utilized by two players
who are Airline Companies in WESSELS, supra note 256, at 433.
268
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ensued. If this were a one-shot game (no likelihood of repeat
play), the vendor who first moves to provide access gets the best
payoff initially. Assume both parties are denying access and
receiving profits of $30 dollars, the incentive for both parties
would be to move towards access. Assume Vendor 1 and Vendor
2 start out in the lower right-hand corner where both deny access.
If Vendor 2 moves towards providing access and if Vendor 1
continues to deny access, Vendor 2 gets a $120 dollar payoff. Of
course, Vendor 1 would then have an incentive to move to provide
access and his payoff would become $100 dollars. Vendor 2 now
also receives $100 dollars. The incentive is to provide access. No
matter what the other vendor does, the dominant strategy is to
provide access. A positive outcome for consumers might be a dip
in prices that could remove entry barriers, allowing new
competitors into the marketplace.
Here’s how the conduct of two hypothetical firms in an
oligopoly might play out in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game using
price as a variable. Assume that if “Premiere” charges $3 per item
it can earn $1000 per day. Meanwhile, ES&S can also earn $1000
per day at $3 per item. If Premiere drops its price and charges $2
per item, it can earn $2000 per day, but only if ES&S continues to
charge $3 per item. If Premiere charges $3, and ES&S drops its
price to $2 per item, Premiere will earn only $500 per day, while
ES&S earns $2000 daily. However, if they both charge $2 dollars,
then both will earn $800 dollars a day.

ES&S $3

ES&S $2

PREMIERE $3
ES&S: $1000 PER DAY
PREMIERE: $1000 PER
DAY
ES&S: $2000 PER DAY
PREMIERE: $500 PER
DAY

PREMEIRE $2
ES&S: $500 PER DAY
PREMIERE: $2000 PER
DAY
ES&S: $800 PER DAY
PREMIERE: $800 PER
DAY

The best strategy for both Premiere and ES&S acting
individually is to charge the lower price. At the lowest price of $2,
each firm has an improved outcome regardless of the other’s
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pricing. This is identical to the Prisoner’s Dilemma: best not to
cooperate (confess) which for the hypothetical firms means both
lowering the price to $2 per item. The optimal strategy is taking
the same action (charging $2) independent of what the other
chooses.269 In an oligopoly (two or fewer), the players are
strategically interacting. One firm’s action has a significant impact
on the other. This condition is called mutual interdependence.270
No matter what the other firm/player does, ES&S has an incentive
to charge the lower price. The payoff of the lowest price is always
better because Premiere can always change its position. The
reverse holds true for ES&S.
Remarkably, by pursuing their individual selfish interests and
not agreeing on the lowest price, both firms end up worse off.
Ironically, this position may be the best one for the consuming
public operating the voting machines.
On the other hand, if everyone cooperates, the best payday
occurs, where both parties agree to charge the higher price as
shown in the upper left hand corner. Both parties get a payoff of
$1,000 dollars, if they could agree to the higher price.271 This
game is known as a zero sum non-cooperative game,272 where each
party chooses the best of the worst: low prices. Premiere does the
same analysis and chooses the worst: low prices. This results in a
stable point, as both choices coincide. Each party’s dominant
strategy is to defect from the agreement. No matter what the other
party does, the individual will be better off defecting from any
agreement to cooperate. Thus the Nash equilibrium here will be
for both parties to cheat on the game.273 The main thing we learn

269

See id. at 442–44.
See id. at 385.
271
Id. at 442–44.
272
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 14 (“The term ‘zero-sum’ (or equivalently, ‘constant sum’)
means the players have diametrically opposed interests. The term comes from parlor
games like poker where there is a fixed amount of money around the table. If you want
to win some money, others have to lose an equivalent amount. Two nations trading make
up a non-zero-sum game since both may simultaneously gain.”).
273
Alan Devlin, A Proposed Solution To the Problem of Parallel Pricing In
Oligopolistic Markets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (2007).
270
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from game theory in single period zero sum games is that any
agreements are likely to be highly unstable.274
Let’s return to Joshua and Jake, the hackers in the game.
Suppose the two belonged to an international gang that engaged in
heavy-handed enforcement powers. Assume that the two had a
pre-arranged binding agreement not to confess. In fact, if anyone
confessed, they would either be physically hurt or not be allowed
to share in the proceeds the gang amassed over the years. In the
face of such an agreement, with a potentially binding punishing
effect, the dominant strategy for each individual would shift. The
dominant strategy for each hacker would be to “deny” and obtain
the higher pay-off.
Let’s re-examine the vendors conduct above using the
Prisoner’s Dilemma275 employing the Nash equilibrium276 in a
repeated game. Remember, the Nash equilibrium describes a
situation where persons interacting with each other choose their
best strategy given the strategies that all the other persons have
chosen. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is known as a two person
zero sum game, where the players have no common interests.277 In
a completely cooperative game, the two players have nothing but
common interests. For example, two barges approaching each
other in a river will both want to avoid a collision; a performing
artist and an audio engineer will both want the performance to
sound good; an air traffic controller and a airplane pilot will both
want a safe landing.278
In a two-person non-zero sum game, the players have both
competitive and non-competitive or cooperative elements.279 The
274

Id.
See supra note 11.
276
See supra note 13.
277
RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 25 (“A zero-sum game is a game in which the sum of
the payoffs of all the players is zero whatever strategies they choose. A game which is
not zero sum is nonzero-sum game or variable-sum.”).
278
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 81.
279
RASMUSEN, supra note 11, at 22 (“The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a noncooperative
game, but it could be modelled as cooperative by allowing the two players not only to
communicate, but to make binding commitments. Cooperate games often allow players
to split the gains from cooperation by making side payments-transfers between
themselves that change the prescribed payoffs.”).
275
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DRE vendor firms have both competitive interests and interests in
common or cooperative interests.
In repeated games, where there is either an infinite number of
games or there is a finite number of games but where the end
period is undetermined, it is possible for firms to maintain their
collusive agreement.280 In fact, the incentive to remain in a
collusive agreement may be higher because the one period benefit
of deviating from the agreement is outweighed by the future and
diminished prices where all of the parties deviate from the
agreement.281 Calculating all of the factors involved, which
include each competitors’ pricing, the likelihood of detection and
the threat of punishment, the Nash equilibrium may well occur at
the collusive level in a repeated game.282 Using game theory in a
repeated non-zero game application, the implication that the
players will collude to arrive at their best strategy begins to
emerge.283
Assume the two vendors (“V1”, “V2”) now have to decide if
they should spend money on research and development to produce
voting machines with increased security encryptions, and available
software protections against specific voter glitches and
malfunctions. The rules of this game are easily identified. If only
one vendor (V1) spends more, it will produce better machines and
will earn larger profits. If both vendors (V1, V2) spend more
money on R&D, then the software will become obsolete faster for
each machine. The result will be less profit for both vendors.284
The following matrix285 depicts the payoffs:

280
281
282
283
284
285

Devlin, supra note 273, at 1119.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
See id. at 1117.
See id. at 1118.
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Vendor 1
(“V1”)
Spends a
Little
Vendor 1
(“V1”)
Spends a Lot

[Vol. 19:689

Vendor 2 (“V2”) Spends
a Little
V2 gets $200
V1 gets $200

Vendor 2 (“V2”)
Spends a Lot
V2 gets $300
V1 gets $50

V2 gets $50
V1 gets $300

V2 gets $100
V1 gets $100

If both parties were able to collude and agree not to spend
money on development and research, they would agree to ‘spend a
little’ and earn more profits. If they both pursued the maximum
strategy, they would both ‘spend a lot’ because this is the ‘best of
the worst.’ If the game is played repeatedly (the decision making),
i.e., as in the marketplace, then the players become cognizant of
the other player’s strategy and would both spend a little and not
spend a lot on research and development.286
In order to keep the prices at a high level, the vendors need
either collusion (cooperation), or a repeated game where they can
detect the other player’s strategy and work to their advantage.
Even with collusion, the incentive is to cheat unless the players,
like Joshua and Jake, have a binding agreement: a threat.287 Each
firm can profit from cutting its price as long as the other firm does
not.288
Like Joshua and Jake in the international gang, the two firms
have an incentive to cheat. But if they can make a binding
agreement to co-operate, even if in a repeating game, they can
ensure that they keep their profits at a supra-competitive level.289

286

See id. at 1119.
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 101 (“A threat is a statement that you will act in a certain
way under certain conditions. . . . The purpose of a threat is to change someone’s
behavior: to make that person do something he or she would not do otherwise. . . . A
threat is effective only to the extent that it is plausible.”).
288
See Devlin, supra note 273, at 1119–20.
289
See id. at 1120.
287
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Decision making in oligopolies involves price competition, as
well as non-price competition. Just as cheating can occur in price
competition, it can also occur in non-price competition as we saw
in the Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 game concerning research and
development. Either vendor could choose not to comply with the
agreement and move to another position. Forms of non-price
competition include: access, advertising, better service and better
quality.290
Before we analyze the DRE oligopoly of the two leading
vendors for their conduct using non-price competition variables in
access, software security and transparent standards, let’s examine
another game. This time we’ll use a repeated game presented by a
game theorist involving miniature powdered beignets.291

Donut
Shop
I’s
Price in
¢ per
dozen

25
24
23
22
21

Donut Shop II’s Price in ¢ per dozen
25
24
23
22
21
(25, 25)
(0, 40)
(0, 30)
(0, 20) (0, 10)
(40, 0)
(20, 20) (0, 30)
(0, 20) (0, 10)
(30, 0)
(30, 0) (15, 15) (0, 20) (0, 10)
(20, 0)
(20, 0)
(20, 0) (10, 10) (0, 10)
(10, 0)
(10, 0)
(10, 0)
(10, 0)
(5, 5)

Both owners of hypothetical Donut Shop I and Donut Shop II
can purchase mini-donuts, called beignet dots from a bakery
supplier at 20¢ per dozen. Together their market share in a large
metropolitan area amounts to 1,000 dozen beignets per day. Both
donut shops have sold their product for 25¢ per dozen. At this
level they both make a profit ($25) and divide the market evenly—
controlling all of the market for beignets sold in their area.292
The matrix represents the payoffs for the donut players. The
first number in each box represents Donut Shop I’s profit in
dollars; the second number in each box represents Donut Shop II’s
290

See Sagi, supra note 14, at 300–01; see also Devlin, supra note 273, at 330–33
(discussing the effects of quality regulation, advertising, and improved transaction terms).
291
See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 85.
292
See id. at 84.
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profit in dollars. Donut Shop I is thinking of reducing the price
from 25¢ a dozen. The products are virtually identical. Customers
easily switch from one brand to another if the price is reduced.
The lower price attracts virtually all of the sales in the market.
Prices are posted each morning on the stores’ signs.293
Profits are entered in the matrix. Those profits correspond to
the set of prices charged by each vendor. If Donut Shop I, reduces
its prices from 25¢ to 24¢, it will capture the entire market and
reaps $40 dollar profits, but only if Donut Shop II continues to
charge 25¢. If Donut Shop I reduces its price to 23¢ and Donut
Shop II simply reduces its price to 24¢, Donut Shop I still captures
the market and earns $30 dollars worth of profit.294
In assessing the payoffs for this game, several items become
clear. The vendor should never charge 25¢ if a price change is
made by the other vendor. Why? Because 25¢ is dominated by
24¢. If a competitor charges 24¢, he will always do better than his
rival who charges 25¢. Nor should a vendor charge less than 21¢.
Any price less than 21¢ will not return a profit.295
Once price cutting begins, 25¢ is ruled out. A competitor can
always do better than his rival by charging 24¢. In fact, once 24¢
is reached by a competitor, the other vendor can always do better
at 23¢. Until one reaches 21¢, the other competitor can always
move and charge less thereby making more profit.296
Surprisingly, from a starting point of 25¢ where the players
received $25 dollars in profits and divided the market evenly,
logical reasoning pushed the players to the 21¢ block where they
earned $5 apiece.297
Playing this game in a non-cooperative strategy results in the
players reaching the lower price of 21¢ and reduced market profits
of $5. The game gets interesting if the players play it more than
one time. If a player drops her price one day, the other competitor
is sure to drop his price the next day; however, if the players
293
294
295
296
297

See id. at 84–85.
See id. at 85.
See id.
See id. at 85–86.
See id. at 86.
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engage in playing over the course of several days, the incentive to
drop prices changes. The players have an opportunity to observe
the competitor’s strategy. In addition, they can see where
cooperation may bring greater payoffs than competition.298
The contribution of modern game theory is to show
that the story becomes much more complicated if
one studies a “repeated game,” in which firms
interact with the same rivals again and again, and
know that they will do so. In such a setting, a firm
must trade off the short-run gains from cheating
against the future cost—in one version, the cost of
never again receiving the supra-competitive price.
In infinitely repeated games, in which the
interaction goes on forever, or in games in which
the end point is uncertain, the firms will be able to
maintain the supracompetitive price if they are able
to detect and respond to one “cheating” rapidly.299
Now, let’s return to our examination of the DRE vendors. The
vendors currently restrict access to the software for independent
auditing and testing,300 experience repeated malfunctions with the
machines during voting301 and have been criticized for ineffective
security and accuracy features.302 They also claim copyright and

298

See id.
Tom, supra note 265, at 459.
300
See supra note 30.
301
See Philips, supra note 7, at 1147 (noting Congress’s Government Accountability
Office was prompted to launch an investigation of the electronic voting machines by the
number of problems in the 2004 election); Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1740 (noting that
during the 2004 presidential election, one electronic voting machine in Carteret County,
N.C., failed to record 4500 votes); John Schwartz, Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic
TIMES,
Nov.
12,
2004,
at
A20,
available
at
Voting,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/12/politics/12evote.html (reporting that some voters
had to have their DREs restarted so that their true votes could be recorded). Tokaji notes
that another electronic voting machine in Franklin County, Ohio, reported almost 4000
extra votes for George W. Bush; however, this error was promptly detected and corrected
by election officials. Id. See generally HARRIS, supra note 7; RUBIN, supra note 7.
302
See supra note 8; see also FELDMAN, HALDERMAN, & FELTEN, supra note 251, at 4
(“One style of [denial of service] attack would make voting machines unavailable on
election day. For example, malicious code could be programmed to make the machine
crash or malfunction at a pre-programmed time.”).
299
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trade secret protections for their software in denying access.303 Yet
scientists have asserted that technology exists at a reasonable cost
to build a DRE voting system—“including hardware, software, and
election procedures”—that is secure and reliable.304
These decisions to deny access by the vendors are puzzling in
light of the public outcry and demand for improved voting
machines. Using game theory tools, it becomes increasingly
apparent that the DRE vendors are acting cooperatively to further
their own self-interests.
First, let’s examine the options available to the vendors in
deciding how to bundle their voting machine software with
services. They could offer a machine which could include
software only (“S”), or software with licensed access to the
proprietary code (“SSA”) for random independent audits, or
software with stricter encryption measures (“SSSE”), or software
with the newest technology for security measures (“SSST”), or
software licensed as open source (“SSSSO”) with all of the above
available security measures. The vendors could also offer software
with any combination of the above services. The profits received
would be a function of the type of service offered: P{S}(software
only), P{SSA}(software with access to the proprietary code for
independent audits and testing), P{SSSE}(software with access
and stricter encryption measures), P{SSST}(software with cutting
edge technology for security and elimination of glitches) and
P{SSSSO}(open source software with the above added
improvements).
Initially any software with a new service would attract
customers. Based on consumer preferences, the vendor (Vendor I)
303

Scholars Long and Massey have chronicled in detail the DRE vendors’ arguments
for copyright proprietary protection in their software. See Long, supra note 29, at 548–
49; Massey, supra note 28, at 235. Critic Levine articulates the trade secret protections
afforded software in DREs. See generally Levine, supra note 7, passim.
304
FELDMAN, HALDERMAN, & FELTEN, supra note 251, at 3 (“Despite these problems,
we believe that it is possible, at reasonable cost, to build a DRE-based voting system—
including hardware, software and election procedures—that is suitably secure and
reliable. Such a system would require not only a voting machine designed with more
care and attention to security, but also an array of safeguards, including a well-designed
voter-verifiable paper audit trail system, random audits and forensic analyses, and truly
independent security review.”)
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offering the newer software package, will receive a larger share of
the market. Its revenue will rise and its customer base will expand.
It will gain customers, while simultaneously Vendor II will lose
customers and revenue. In the interim, prices may begin to
modestly decline as other firms enter the market, software open
source licenses become competitive, and buyers seek other
computer software developers to customize product. Vendor II
will lose customers and revenue. Vendor II acting strategically
may offer the new software at reduced prices or change the product
offered. Ultimately the price will drop. Let’s examine the best
strategy for these two players.
In the beginning both vendors offer S (software only); they
share the market equally and earn profits of X. What happens if
one vendor defects and tries to offer the voting machine software
machines with additional services and better quality? The matrix
below displays the payoffs.305
Vendor I’s Choices306

2.

Vendor
II’s
Choices

S
SSA
SSSE
SSST
SSSSO

S
50, 50
80, 0
60, 0
40, 0
20, 0

SSA
0, 80
40, 40
60, 0
40, 0
20, 0

SSE
0, 60
0, 60
30, 30
40, 0
20, 0

SSST
0, 40
0, 40
0, 40
20, 20
20, 0

SSSO
0, 20
0, 20
0, 20
0, 20
10, 10

Even in the face of an agreement, the best position of the
individual vendor is to offer one or more of the new improved
services if it wishes to gain customers, increase its market share
and improve its profits. Any such move would cause its rival to
rethink its position. There is no advantage for the firm in staying
in the software only (no access) position when its rival firm moves
to another position. In following the equilibrium strategies (and
305

See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 85.
Note: there could be any combination of the services offered by the vendors. It is in
the best interests of the individual DRE vendor to defect and offer one or more of the
bundled services. The vendor will always be better off offering one of the services.
306
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there may be more than one) a firm’s most dominant strategy is to
offer improved services and quality to gain increased profits and
market share.
In an oligopoly, we often see that the individual firms which
normally would seek to maximize profits by pursuing individual
competitive strategies act collectively to keep prices high, and
maintain control of output.307 In an oligopoly, this collective
action can occur if the players can make binding agreements to
cooperate, like Joshua and Jake. The binding agreements can
occur through overt action or tacit collusion.308
The matrix represents the profits of the vendors. The first
number represents Vendor II, the second number represents
Vendor I. Those profits correspond to the set of services offered
by each vendor. If Vendor II provides a machine with access to
software (SSA), he moves from a block (S) with 50% of the profit,
to one with 80% of the profit because of increased market share
and customer preference. This DRE (Vendor II) would capture the
majority of the market. Vendor I’s share would immediately drop
to 0. If DRE Vendor II offers bundling to include increased
encryption standards (SSSE), his share may drop to 60% profit but
Vendor I’s profit remains at 0 as longs as Vendor I refuses to offer
access. Now look at the positions if Vendor II moves to offer
access to software (SSA) and subsequently Vendor I moves to
offer access (SSA) immediately in a repeated play. They both
reach market profits of 40%.
However, as soon as Vendor II moves to offer another
improved product (SSSE), Vendor I’s profit drops to 0 and Vendor
II increases his share to 60%. Ultimately, one of the equilibrium
points for both parties would be to offer SSSE (Software with
access and increased encryption standards). At that point, neither

307

Shelanski, supra note 18, at 86.
Piraino, supra note 25, at 16 (“In a perfectly competitive market, with many
competing firms and easy terms of entry and exit, firms must price at the market level
(i.e. at marginal cost) or risk losing sales to competitors. However, in an oligopoly,
where there are only a few sellers, it is easier for those sellers to cooperate to raise prices
above the normal competitive level. Coordination among oligopolists can allow sellers to
price above marginal cost at ‘supracompetitive’ prices.” (citation omitted)).
308
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party would have an increased incentive to move. Both parties
would share market share of 30%.
Yet, an incentive to deviate and keep moving could occur. It
would never pay to offer more bundling services than the open
source (SSSSO) because the parties would barely earn a profit. In
fact, the far right corner (10, 10) may represent the lowest profit
return for the parties providing a complete set of services.
However, the incentive to offer a machine with improved services
exists as a Nash equilibrium point. The only effective way to
maintain the highest prices (50, 50), in such a repeated game is to
agree to maintain the pricing as it currently exists and refuse to
offer improved services.309
In a one-shot game, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the players
have no opportunity to make promises about the future. Their
Nash equilibrium is to not cooperate. Also, if they know their
actions are interdependent, and yet they will never meet again for
the next game, there is no incentive to react differently (i.e. to
cooperate).310 However, the outcome of the game changes if the
vendors believe that there is a high probability that they will play
the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly. In the face of a repeated game,
rational cooperation between the two vendors becomes much more
likely.311
As one theorist states, where the players always believe that
there is a high probability that they will play the Prisoner’s
Dilemma again, and if this probability is large enough, with a
sufficiently high payoff, the repeated game has many Nash
equilibria.312 In some of these strategies, cooperation is always
played on the equilibrium path.313
309

See KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 72–73 (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK) (2007); Sagi, supra note 14, at 277 n.11 (“[E]ach player's
goal is to find her payoff maximizing strategy, taking into account the rival's strategy. To
solve the game, the game theorist needs to find the strategies that solve each player's
problem. Such strategies constitute a stable solution if neither player has an incentive to
change her strategy, given the rival's strategy.”); infra notes 310–13 and accompanying
text.
310
BINMORE, supra note 309, at 72.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Id.
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The DRE vendors control the product supply and the level of
services for each type of machine. They operate in all 50 states
and repeatedly conduct their activities.
By controlling output collectively and refusing to provide
access, the firms in an oligopoly act like a monopoly. They sell
the voting machines with a level of service and technological
capacity at an inefficient level given the market demand for access
to the software and accuracy in the output. Their output is
produced less efficiently and at a higher cost to society than the
output which could be produced by firms in a competitive industry.
They fail to produce at a socially optimal output level.314
This conduct and behavior is against the firms’ self-interest and
contradicts a social economic policy of a competitive marketplace
offering maximum quality at an equilibrium price.315 The
oligopoly firms operate as a monopoly creating an inefficient
market where the price of using the voting machines is artificially
high and the quality of the product (numerous voting machine
malfunctions) deliberatively low.316 Consider the conduct of a
well known monopolist, Microsoft.
Microsoft, for example, has refused to disclose
information on the interfaces to its Windows
operating system, which are necessary for
competing programmers to create applications that
are compatible with Windows. It has been argued
that Microsoft maintained the secrecy of such
information to give its applications programmers a
head start over those developing competing
applications, as well as to preclude competing
applications from evolving into an operating
platform that ultimately could challenge the
314

Piraino, supra note 25, at 16 (“Economists believe that such prices have two
significant adverse effects. First, they harm consumers by transferring wealth from
purchasers to producers. Second, they may cause purchasers to forego buying a product
entirely.” (citations omitted)).
315
Id. (noting that the potential losses from purchasers foregoing buying a product are
“not offset by any gain to sellers”).
316
See id. at 36 (arguing that protecting Microsoft’s monopoly “reduces Microsoft's
incentive to limit price increases and to continue to innovate in operating system products
and services”).
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dominance of the Windows operating system. In
declining to disclose such information to outside
programmers, Microsoft was acting against its
legitimate self-interest. It would be in Microsoft’s
best interest to maximize the number of applications
that utilize its operating system. Such a strategy
would make Windows even more useful to
consumers and maximize Microsoft’s immediate
revenue.317
As in the case of the monopolist, there is no incentive for the
two (or three firms) to improve quality by allowing access for preelection logic and accuracy testing, or independent post-election
auditing, or licensing open source software. Like the author asserts
about Microsoft, when a monopoly [or oligopoly] acts against “its
self-interest and makes it more difficult for competing applications
to run on its system, it is reasonable to conclude that Microsoft’s
[or the oligopolists’] real purpose was to perpetuate its operating
system monopoly.”318
Allowing access could reduce the price, lower the entry barrier
and potentially entice other firms to enter and ultimately eliminate
the exorbitant monopoly supra-competitive profits.319
In the DRE marketplace, the preclusion of access for
independent testing and auditing, the lack of improved security
measures and the repeated glitches affecting accuracy, directly
impacts a public good—the voting process. Using the game theory
analysis, it is apparent that the firms should strategically provide
access, or allow open source licensing or some variation which
would maximize their individual profits.320

317

Id.
Id.
319
Id. at 37 (“Like monopolists, oligopolists have a greater ability and incentive to
engage in anticompetitive conduct than firms in less concentrated markets.”). Piraino
contends that courts should recognize that when oligopolists act collectively to maintain
prices, they are exercising the same type of market powers as a monopolist. Id. He
argues that such conduct harms consumers by “denying them the choice of alternative
applications.” Id. at 36.
320
See BINMORE, supra note 309, at 72–73.
318
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Using a game theory analysis, the refusal of each of the DRE
vendors to provide access or improved quality can only be
explained by the existence of some type of cooperative conduct.321
There are no governmental regulatory impediments to access.
HAVA, which helped to fuel the oligopoly, does not prohibit
access. There are no technological barriers since computer
scientists have been analyzing these types of software problems for
decades.322
A birds-eye view of one state’s voting process highlights the
control exercised by two oligopolists. Florida was the site of the
2000 election dispute that sparked the Bush v. Gore323 ruling.
Bush v. Gore, in turn, was the impetus for the HAVA Act, which
provided the cash that has resulted in the current DRE vendor
oligopoly.324 In the November 2008 general election, sixty-seven
of Florida’s counties were to use machines that were the product of
two or three vendors.325 The voting systems were the products of
Premier Elections, ES&S and Sequoia.326
Florida’s voting process has changed since the disputed
presidential election of 2000. Like the majority of states, Florida
now operates with DREs.327 These machines, while improving the

321

HAVA does not require the vendors to restrict access to their proprietary software.
See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545
(2006)); see also Piraino, supra note 25, at 18 (“[John] Nash emphasized that
‘interdependence is the distinguishing feature of games of strategy’ in that ‘[t]he outcome
of a game for one player depends on what all the other players choose to do and vice
versa.’ . . . In certain cases, players will choose to cooperate rather than to compete,
because they will conclude that they have more to gain from committing themselves to a
collective strategy with their rivals.” (citations omitted)).
322
See generally Philips, supra note 7.
323
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
324
See 148 CONG. REC. H2597 (daily ed. May 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. Foley)
(“[W]hether an Al Gore supporter or a George Bush supporter, no one's vote should have
been called into question. . . . This bill brings us light-years forward in hoping to never
revisit that time and that place again.”).
325
See Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election,
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf.
326
Id. Premier Elections Solutions, Inc. was formerly Diebold Elections Systems. See
Florida Division of Elections, Vendors of Certified Voting Systems, https://doe.
dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/certified-vendors.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
327
Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election, http://doe.
dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf.
Thirty-one states
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election administration process, are the products of private firms,
fueled by federal dollars operating in an oligopolistic marketplace.
The voting process in Florida, like other states, precludes
public access to the software for independent testing or auditing.
In addition, local and state governmental entities rely on the
vendors for training and support. Most of the counties listed do
not provide the voters with paper ballots.328 However, many states
have moved to a voter verified paper receipt.329 The public is left
to vote on machines where glitches, vote tallying inaccuracies and
malfunctions are possible.
No voting system, electronic or otherwise, can be perfect. The
problem remains that if a dispute occurs involving the fundamental
voting interests, the voting rights are subsumed within the
intellectual property rights asserted by the DRE owners. Because
the owners operate within an oligopoly, their collective financial
interests are set to preclude the public from access to the inner
workings of the machines to further their financial gains.
Two constitutional interests, voting and intellectual property
rights, collide within these electronic voting machines. The
alarming result of the vendor oligopoly is private control of a
fundamental liberty interest.

operate with DREs. See Election Equipment 2008, VerifiedvotingFoundation.org, http://
www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
328
Voting System in Use for the November 4, 2008 General Election,
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/voting-systems/pdf/VS_Web_Display_10-9-08.pdf.
Of the
sixty-seven Florida counties, thirty-nine used DREs which could not provide a paper
ballot on demand. Id.
329
See Election Equipment 2008, VerifiedvotingFoundation.org, http://www.
verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). Of the states exclusively
employing DREs in elections, Nevada and Utah were the only two states using DREs
with voter verified paper receipts, while Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, New
Jersey, and South Carolina used DREs that did not provide voter verified paper receipts.
Id. Of the states that offered both paper ballots and DREs in elections, twelve states only
used DREs with voter verified paper receipts, seven states, along with the District of
Columbia, only used DREs without voter verified paper receipts, and four states used a
mixture of DREs that provide voter verified paper receipts and DREs that did not provide
voter verified paper receipts. Id. Nineteen states, along with Puerto Rico, did not use
DREs at all. Id.
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CONCLUSION
An oligopoly currently operates in the DRE voting machine
marketplace where federal elections are conducted. A few
vendors, fueled by federal dollars provided through the HAVA
Act, supply the majority of the electronic voting machines to the
fifty states. These few vendors refuse to improve the quality of
their voting machines, provide access to the software or upgrade
the technology of the machines to eliminate the numerous reported
glitches, errors and malfunctions of the voting machines. These
DRE vendors maintain that the federal and state intellectual
property protections for their software, both copyright and trade
secrets, protect their property interests in the voting machines and
preclude independent access by the interested public for auditing,
licensing and upgrading purposes. The fundamental liberty
interests in voting and access to a fair and fraud-free election held
by Americans is slowly being subsumed by the claims of
intellectual property protections for the software.
Utilizing game theory, it is apparent that the firms in this
marketplace collectively act to maintain prices, output and quality
based on financial interests. Their pricing and output strategy is a
function of the interdependence and pricing strategies of their rival
DRE vendors. The individual self-interests of the vendor would
dictate changes in the pricing and output decisions to allow access
to the proprietary software of the DRE machines. Analysis of the
DRE vendors conduct, using game theory, leads to the inevitable
conclusion that these vendors are collectively acting against their
individual self-interests in improving to maintain monopolistic
control. The consequence of the oligopolistic market control is
that the federal election process is held hostage to vendors’
financial self-interest.
Given the importance of fair and fraud-free elections, the best
course for resolving the conflict between voting rights and
intellectual property rights would be for Congress to intervene. A
redefinition of the HAVA Act, requiring DRE vendors to provide
independent auditing and security testing, verified voter paper
trials, increased security protections and certifications, and
effective oversight from the EAC could protect America’s most
fundamental liberty. Whereas this would likely reduce the profits
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of DRE vendors due to an increase in competition, the American
public would benefit.
Lacking Congressional intervention, the Courts will be
required to resolve numerous anticipated voting disputes involving
the DREs. Their task—balancing a fundamental liberty interest
against a property interest within the context of an oligopolistic
marketplace—priceless.
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APPENDIX 1: VOTING SYTEMS: STATE-BY-STATE330
VENDORS

NO. OF

STATES

STATES
SUPPLIED
1. Advanced Voting

2

Miss., Va.

Solutions
2. AutoMark Technical

0

Systems
3. Avante International

0

Technology
4. Dominion

0

5. Election Systems &

39

Software (“ES&S”)

Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal.,
Colo., Fla., Haw.,
Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa,
Kan., Ky., Me., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Miss.,
Mo., Mont., Neb.,
N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ohio, Okla., Or., Pa.,
R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Tex., Va., Wash., W.
Va., Wis., Wyo.

6. Hart InterCivic

12

Cal., Colo., Haw., Ill.,
Ky., Ohio, Or., Pa.,
Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash.

7. MicroVote General

3

Ind., Ky., Tenn.

Corp.
8. Precise Voting

0

330
SOURCE: The information in Appendix I was obtained through corresponding state
websites and state responses to a FOIA request for information regarding electronic
voting machines. The twelve voting system manufacturers listed in Appendix I have
registered with the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and meet the requirements of
Chapter 2 of EAC’s Testing and Certification Program Manual. See Registered
Manufacturers,
U.S.
Election
Assistance
Commission,
http://www.eac.
gov/voting%20systems/voting-system-certification/registered-manufacturers (last visited
Apr. 21, 2009). Note also that Danaher Corporation (Mfg.) supplies to Del., Ky., and Pa.
and that Unilect supplies to Va.
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9. Premier Election

31

Solutions

Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo.,
Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill.,
Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky.,
Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., Mo.,
N.H., N.Y., Ohio, Pa.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt.,
Va., Wash., Wis., Wyo.

10. Sequoia Voting

18

Ariz., Cal., Colo., D.C.,
Fla., Idaho, Ill., La.,
Mich., Mo., Nev., N.J.,
N.Y., Or., Pa., Va.,
Wash., Wis.

11. Truvote

0

International
12. Unisyn Voting
Solutions

0
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